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Executive summary
Over the 1995-2004 period, the evolution of stock market indices in the United
States and Europe exhibited a distinct boom-and-bust pattern, rising dramatical-
ly during the second half of the 1990s and falling sharply at the turn of the
century. These changes in asset prices affected household wealth and the financ-
ing cost of investments, so that the period of rising asset prices was also
characterised by strong economic growth, while the period of falling asset prices
saw weaker growth. As equity markets were largely driven by “irrational exuber-
ance” in the second half of the 1990s1, it is sometimes argued that, in order to
foster a more balanced growth path, the monetary authorities in the United States
and the euro area should have targeted changes in a price index which not only
includes contemporaneous consumer prices but also asset prices.
In this Working Paper we assess the worldwide macroeconomic implications of
an interest rate rule whereby the major central banks of the world target not only
changes in the traditional consumer price index but also changes in asset prices.
We do this by simulating the NIME model over the 1995-2004 period with an inter-
est rate rule similar to the well-known Taylor rule, but augmented for changes in
asset prices2.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we give a quick overview of the major
macroeconomic developments in the euro area, the United States and Japan over
the 1995-2004 period, highlighting that changes in asset prices were not a major
concern of the monetary authorities as they set the short-term interest rates. Next,
starting form a broad price index and a functional form similar to the traditional
Taylor rule, we specify an interest rate rule whereby monetary authorities target
not only consumer price inflation and the output gap, but also changes in asset
prices and changes in the output gap. Finally, we use the global macroeconomet-
ric  NIME model to calculate how the macroeconomic variables of the major
economic areas would have behaved over the 1995-2004 period, had the mone-
tary authorities of these areas implemented such a broad-based interest rate rule.
The results of the counterfactual simulation can be summarised as follows. Had
the interest rate rule proposed in this Working Paper been adopted by the major
central banks over the 1995-2004 period, interest rates in Europe and the United
States would most likely have come out above their historical baseline for most
of the 1995-2000 period. For example, the US short-term interest rate would have
been 1.4 percentage-points above its historical baseline in 1999, while the short-
term interest rate of the euro area would have come out 0.9 percentage-point
1. See for instance Shiller (2005) and Greenspan (1996). 
2. The NIME model is a macroeconometric world model developed by economists of the Belgian Federal Planning
Bureau. See Appendix A for more details regarding the NIME model.Working Paper 17-05
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above its baseline in 2000. The rate hikes in the euro area and the United States
would have lowered these areas’ domestic demand by increasing the cost of in-
vestment and lowering household wealth. However, as the rate hikes would have
been highest in the United States, the US dollar would have appreciated against
other major currencies, thereby restraining US export growth but stimulating ex-
port growth from Europe and, especially, from Japan. After 2000, the
implementation of this alternative interest rate rule would most likely have led to
a fall in interest rates relative to their historical baseline in the euro area and the
United States; over this period, domestic demand in these areas would have come
out above their historical baseline level. Once again, the effect of the interest rate
cuts on exchange rates is not straightforward, as all areas except Japan would
have made important rate cuts. In Japan such cuts would not have been possible,
due to the fact that the Japanese zero interest rate policy and the policy of quan-
titative easing had already brought nominal interest rates down to their lower
bound.
The counterfactual simulation indicates that a broad-based interest rate rule
would have pushed the euro area’s GDP above its historical level by about 0.3 per
cent by the end of the 1995-2004 period and would have reduced US GDP by about
0.6 per cent by the end of the same period1. Japanese GDP would have come out
1.3 per cent above its historical baseline level by the end of the 1995-2004 period,
mainly due to strong gains in exports resulting from the weakening of the yen in
the wake of the rising foreign interest rates. Nevertheless, implementing the al-
ternative interest rate rule would have reduced output volatility somewhat.
Finally, as a caveat, it should be noted that although the new interest rate rule
lowers output variability, the rule we implement is based on target values ob-
tained through a filtering process applied to a historical outcome. In real-time
however, defining targets for asset prices may not be straightforward and be sur-
rounded by great uncertainty.
1. Measured as the discounted cumulative deviations of these variables from their baseline levels.Working Paper 17-05
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I Introduction and summary
A.Selected stylised facts for the 1995-2004 period
Over the 1995-2004 period, the evolution of stock market indices in the United
States and Europe showed a distinct boom-and-bust pattern (see Table 1). In the
euro area, stock market indices increased on average by 22.5 per cent per annum
between 1995 and 2000, only to fall at an annual average rate of 20.2 per cent be-
tween 2001 and 2003, followed by a 20.6 per cent increase in 2004. In the United
States, the S&P500 index increased on average by 21 per cent per annum over the
1995-2000 period. It then fell at an annual average rate of 12 per cent between 2001
and 2003, but subsequently rebounded by 17.2 per cent in 2004. At the same time,
euro area real GDP grew at an average rate of 2.5 per cent per annum over the
1995-2000 period, compared with just 1.3 per cent over 2001-2004. In the United
States, real GDP growth averaged 3.9 per cent over the 1995-2000 period, com-
pared with 2.5 per cent over 2001-2004 period. Moreover, inflation remained
fairly low and stable throughout the whole period, averaging 1.9 per cent per an-
num in both the euro area and the United States1 (see Table 1).
TABLE 1 - Selected macroeconomic variables for the 1995-2004 period
(period average, growth rates - unless otherwise specified)  
Against this background, interest rates were kept fairly low for most part of the
1995-2004 period, when compared with the average rates prevailing since the
1970s. In the euro area, the nominal short-term interest rate fell from 7.1 per cent
in 1995 to 3.2 per cent in 1999, after which it was raised abruptly to 4.5 per cent in
2000 before declining to 2.1 per cent in 2004. In the United States, the nominal
short-term interest rate stood at 6 per cent in 1995, fell to 5.4 per cent in 1999, be-
fore jumping to a peak of 6.5 per cent in 2000. The US rate subsequently declined
to just 1.2 per cent in 2003 and rose to an average of 1.6 per cent in 2004.
1. Measured as the change in the consumer price deflator.



















Gross domestic product 2.5 1.3 3.0 1.9 3.9 2.5 1.4 1.0
Private consumption 2.4 1.2 3.3 2.6 4.1 3.2 0.9 0.8
Gross fixed capital formation 3.7 -0.4 5.9 2.9 7.8 1.9 0.9 -1.2
Private consumption price  1.8 2.1 2.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 -0.1 -0.9
Short-term interest rate (level) 4.8 3.0 6.1 4.1 5.8 2.1 0.6 0.1
Long-term interest rate (level) 6.2 4.5 6.5 4.8 6.1 4.5 2.2 1.2
Equity price 22.5 -10.0 12.8 -7.6 21.0 -4.7 -1.5 -8.4
Residential building price 2.7 7.0 8.9 11.9 5.3 9.0 -2.6 -4.8Working Paper 17-05
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While equity prices showed signs of what was coined as “irrational exuberance”
in the second half of the 1990s1, economic policy makers generally adopted an at-
titude of benign neglect with respect to asset price developments; this appears
clearly from the testimony of Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
(1999) before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services in July 1999: “The
danger is that in these circumstances, an unwarranted, perhaps euphoric, exten-
sion of recent developments can drive equity prices to levels that are
unsupportable even if risks in the future become relatively small. Such straying
above fundamentals could create problems for our economy when the inevitable
adjustment occurs. It is the job of economic policy makers to mitigate the fallout when
it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.” (italics added).
This given, it is interesting to investigate how the US and euro area economies
might have evolved had these areas’ central banks not only targeted changes in
the consumer price index but also changes in asset prices. We do this by simulat-
ing the NIME model2 over the 1995-2004 period, with an interest rate rule similar
to the Taylor rule but augmented for changes in asset prices3.
The inclusion of changes in asset prices in the new interest rate rule is motivated
by the fact that the household sector’s intertemporal utility depends not only on
contemporaneous prices and income, but also on future prices and income. In-
deed, if equity prices rise above (fall below) their fundamentals, households tend
to consume more (less) than if equity prices increase in line with their fundamen-
tals. However, if equity prices rise above (drop below) their fundamentals, a
future fall (rise) in equity prices will be necessary to restore stock market equilib-
rium and this future correction in asset prices will entail a future drop (increase)
in private consumption. The size of the response of the short-term interest rate to
the deviation of asset price inflation from its target rate is primarily determined
by the weight of each expenditure item in the household’s overall budget, as well
as by the parameter values of the monetary authorities’ loss function.
B.A counterfactual simulation for the 1995-2004 period
The results of the counterfactual simulation can be summarised as follows. Had
an interest rate rule such as the one proposed in this Working Paper been adopted
over the 1995-2004 period by the world’s major central banks, interest rates in Eu-
rope and the United States would have come out above their historical baseline
levels up to 2000. For example, the US short-term interest rate would have been
1.4 percentage-points above its historical baseline in 1999, while the short-term
interest rate of the euro area would have been 0.9 percentage-point above base-
line in 2000. The rate hikes in the euro area and the United States would have
lowered these areas’ domestic demand by increasing the cost of investment and
reducing household wealth. However, as the rate hikes would have been highest
in the United States, the US dollar would have appreciated against the other major
currencies, thereby restraining export growth in the US and stimulating export
growth from Europe and, especially, from Japan. After 2000, the implementation
of the alternative interest rate rule would have led to a fall in interest rates below
1. See for instance Shiller (2000) and Greenspan (1996). 
2. The NIME model is a macroeconometric world model developed by economists of the Belgian Federal Planning
Bureau. See Appendix A for more details regarding the NIME model.
3. See Taylor (1993) or Meyermans (2002.b) for more details regarding the Taylor rule.Working Paper 17-05
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their historical baseline levels in the euro area and the United States; during this
period, domestic demand in both areas would have come out above their histor-
ical baseline. Once again, the effect of the interest rate cuts on exchange rates is
not straightforward as all areas except Japan would have benefited from signifi-
cant interest rate cuts. In Japan, such cuts would not have been possible, as
Japanese monetary authorities had already pushed historical nominal interest
rates down to their lower bound.
On balance, the counterfactual simulation indicates for instance that a broad-
based interest rate rule would have pushed the euro area’s GDP above its histori-
cal level by about 0.3 per cent by the end of the 1995-2004 period and would have
reduced US GDP by about 0.6 per cent by the end of the same period1. Japanese
GDP would have come out 1.3 per cent above its historical baseline level by the
end of the 1995-2004 period, mainly due to gains in exports stemming from the
weakening of the yen in the wake of rising foreign interest rates (see Table 2).
Nevertheless, Table 2 also shows that the implementation of the alternative inter-
est rule would have reduced output volatility2 somewhat.
TABLE 2 - Macroeconomic performance during the 1995-2004 period 
Summary of the counterfactual outcome  
Finally, we wish to mention a number of limitations inherent to our analysis. First,
it should be noted that although the new interest rate rule lowers output variabil-
ity, the rule itself is based on target values obtained through a filtering process
applied to a historical outcome. In real-time however, formulating targets for as-
set prices may not be straightforward and be surrounded by great uncertainty.3
Second, the new interest rate rule focuses only on two specific asset prices, i.e. the
price of equities and the price of residential buildings. In proceeding in this man-
ner, we ignore for instance the exchange rate as a possible supplementary target
of the monetary authorities. Indeed, our analysis uses the household intertempo-
ral utility function to define an alternative interest rate rule, and it would not have
been trivial to determine the weight of an exchange rate target in a new interest
rate rule derived in this manner. Indeed, a change in the exchange rate affects
household utility directly through its effect on the price of imports; it also affects
household utility indirectly through the changes it may bring to employment, re-
sulting from the output effect of a change in competitiveness. Third, by focusing
exclusively on a broad price index for the household sector, and given the highly
aggregated nature of the business sector in the NIME model, we give little weight
1. Measured as the discounted cumulative deviations of these variables from their baseline levels.
2. Measured by the standard deviation of real GDP.
 Euro  area Western 
non-euro EU
United States Japan
Discounted cumulative deviations from baseline level over 1995-2004
Private consumption 0.1 -1.0 -0.8 0.3
Gross fixed capital formation 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.4
Exports 0.7 3.0 -2.6 8.9
Imports -0.5 0.4 -2.2 -0.1
Gross Domestic Product 0.3 0.2 -0.6 1.3
Standard deviation over 1995-2004
Historical GDP 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.5
Counterfactual GDP 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.4
3. This kind of informational problem, associated with the implementation of Taylor-type interest rate rules, is not only related
to asset prices but also with output gaps. See Orphanides (2001), Dupor (2005), and Robinson and Stone (2005).Working Paper 17-05
6
to the distorting effect that asset price bubbles may have on the allocation of in-
vestment within the business sector. Fourth, our analysis assumes that our
alternative interest rate rule does not affect the underlying trend values, includ-
ing trend inflation, trend productivity growth, and the equilibrium interest rate,
thereby ignoring possible hysteresis effects. Fifth, it is assumed that the underly-
ing forces which drive the rise and fall of stock prices are exogenous and that
interest rates affect stock prices only to the extent that they modify the rate at
which the (exogenous) expected dividends are discounted, thereby ignoring for
instance the signalling effects that interest rate changes may have on the private
sector’s dividend outlook.
The rest of this Working Paper is organized as follows. First, we give a quick over-
view of the major macroeconomic facts of the 1995-2004 period and we show that
developments in asset prices did not seem to be a major concern of the major cen-
tral banks. Next, starting from a broad price index and a functional form similar
to the traditional Taylor rule, we specify an interest rate rule whereby the mone-
tary authorities not only target consumer price inflation and the output gap, but
also changes in asset prices as well as changes in the output gap. Finally, we use
the NIME model to simulate how the macroeconomic variables of the major eco-
nomic areas would have evolved over the 1995-2004 period, had monetary
authorities implemented such a broad-based interest rate rule.Working Paper 17-05
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II Selected stylised facts for the 1995-2004 
period
In the first section of this chapter, we summarise the main macroeconomic devel-
opments in the major economic areas of the world over the 1995-2004 period. In
the second section, we examine to what extent the central banks of these areas
took asset price inflation into account when setting their short-term interest rates.
A.Asset price inflation and economic fluctuations
1. Some empirical regularities
Table 3 illustrates for the major economic areas of the world to what extent fluc-
tuations in the main economic aggregates are correlated with fluctuations in
equity prices, the deflator of residential buildings and interest rates1.
In all areas the correlation between the fluctuations in real equity prices and busi-
ness investment is fairly high, while the correlations between equity prices and
the other components of aggregate demand are also not negligible. The correla-
tion between equity prices and real GDP is highest in the US and lowest in the euro
area.
The fluctuations in real estate prices show a distinctively high positive correlation
with the fluctuations in household consumption and residential investment, es-
pecially in the Western non-euro EU member states2. In the euro area, this
correlation is lower than in the other major areas, possibly indicating the presence
of more strictly regulated financial markets that limit the possibilities that house-
holds have of borrowing against their assets.
Finally, the correlation between fluctuations in the real interest rate and the com-
ponents of demand are negative in all cases except for US business sector
investment and imports. We may note that the correlation between interest rates
and real GDP is usually markedly higher in the euro area than in the other major
economic areas of the world.
1. A fluctuation is defined as a deviation from trend. Trend values are obtained applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter
to the historical data series. Prices and interest rates are deflated by the price indice of gross private sector
output. Expenditure items are given per capita. The sample size is 1970-2004. Data is annual.
2. This area comprises Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.Working Paper 17-05
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The previous statistics summarize a number of co-movements between fluctua-
tions in macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices over a relatively long time
period. Let us now have a closer look at the developments in each of the areas
over 1995-2004. We focus on the developments in Europe, in the United States,
and in Japan.
TABLE 3 - Price-quantity correlations for the 1970-2004 period  
2. Europe and the United States over the 1995-2004 period
a. The evolution of asset prices
Equity prices in Europe and the United States have shown a distinct boom-and-
bust pattern over the 1995-2004 period, with a strong rise in the late 1990s fol-
lowed by a sharp correction following the turn of the century.
In the euro area, stock market indices increased on average by 22.5 per cent per
annum between 1995 and 2000, only to fall at an annual average rate of 20.2 per
cent between 2001 and 2003, followed by a 20.6 per cent increase in 20041. At the
same time, real estate prices increased by 4.4 per cent over the 1995-2004 period,
growing somewhat faster after the turn of the century than in the second half of
the 1990s (see Figure 1 and Table 4).
In the United States, the S&P500 index increased on average by 21 per cent per
annum over the 1995-2000 period. It then fell at an annual average rate of 12 per
cent between 2001 and 2003, only to rebound by 17.2 per cent in 2004. Throughout
the whole period, real estate prices showed a robust annual increase of 6.8 per
cent (see Figure 2 and Table 6).




GDP 0.24 0.34 0.37 0.33
Private consumption 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.13
Business investment 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.46
Residential investment 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.40
Imports 0.25 0.37 0.47 0.26
Exports 0.04 0.27 0.15 -0.19
Deflator of residential buildings
GDP 0.00 0.68 0.61 0.57
Private consumption 0.17 0.86 0.55 0.35
Business investment 0.01 0.62 0.09 0.66
Residential investment 0.20 0.79 0.47 0.60
Imports 0.05 0.65 0.30 0.54
Exports -0.34 0.04 0.20 -0.26
Long-term interest rate
GDP -0.45 -0.18 -0.23 -0.23
Private consumption -0.28 -0.22 -0.17 -0.27
Business investment -0.32 -0.13 0.00 -0.33
Residential investment -0.10 -0.10 0.02 -0.17
Imports -0.44 -0.27 0.07 -0.53
Exports -0.21 -0.05 -0.50 -0.14
1. The GDP-weighted average of the German Dax, the French CAC40, the Italian MIBtel and the Belgian Bel20.Working Paper 17-05
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FIGURE 1 - Asset prices in the euro area: 1995-2004 
(growth rates) 
FIGURE 2 - Asset prices in the United States: 1995-2004 
(growth rates)
FIGURE 3 - Asset prices in the Western non-euro EU Member States: 1995-2004 
(growth rates)
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A composite stock market indice for the Western non-euro EU Member States1 in-
creased on average by 12.8 per cent during the 1995-2000 period and fell on
average by 7.6 per cent per annum over the 2001-2004 period, thereby yielding an
annual average increase of 4.6 per cent over the whole 1995-2004 period. Moreo-
ver, in this area, real estate prices were especially strong in later years, rising at an
annual average rate of about 12 per cent over 2000-2004 (see Figure 3 and Table 5).
b. The evolution of final demand
While stock markets in Europe and the United States displayed distinct boom-
and-burst patterns over the 1995-2004 period, aggregate demand and its compo-
nents showed a similar - albeit more tempered - evolution.
In the euro area, real GDP growth averaged 2.5 per cent per year from 1995 to 2000,
compared with only 1.3 per cent from 2001 to 2004 (see Figure 4). At the same
time, private consumption growth came out on average at 1.9 per cent over the
1995-2004 period, reaching a high of 3.5 per cent in 1999 and a low of 0.6 per cent
in 2002. Business sector investment increased on average by 3.1 per cent over the
entire period, rising by up to 7.3 per cent in 1998 and falling by up to 3 per cent in
2002. Over the 1995-2004 period, euro area exports and imports rose on average
by 5.8 and 5.9 per cent respectively. However, export growth reached a peak of
18.1 per cent in 2000 and fell by -2.1 per cent in 2003. Imports grew by 16.5 per
cent in 2000 and fell by -0.7 per cent in 2002 (see Figure 5 and Table 4).
US real GDP grew on average by 3.9 per cent per annum over the 1995-2000 period,
compared with 2.5 per cent over 2001-2004, resulting in an average growth rate of
3.3 per cent over the whole 1995-2004 period (see Figure 6 and Table 6). Business
sector investment grew on average by 9.7 per cent per year over 1995-2000, before
falling to an average growth rate of 0.4 per cent over 2001-2004. Private consump-
tion was also relatively robust over the 1995-2000 period as it increased on
average by 4.1 per cent, compared with 3.2 per cent over the 2001-2004 period (see
Figure 7 and Table 6).
In the Western non-euro EU Member States, real GDP grew on average by 2.6 per
cent over the 1995-2004 period, reaching a high of 3.7 per cent in 2000 and a low
of 1.3 per cent in 2002 (see Figure 8 and Table 5). Private consumption and busi-
ness sector investment grew at annual average rates of 3 and 5.7 per cent,
respectively, over the 1995-2004 period. Over 1995-2000 they increased by 3.3 and
8.7 per cent respectively, compared with 2.6 and 1.2 per cent respectively over the
2001-2004 period (see Figure 9 and Table 5).
1. This area comprises Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.Working Paper 17-05
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FIGURE 4 - Real GDP and consumer price inflation in the euro area: 1995-2004
(growth rates) 
 
FIGURE 5 - Components of demand in the euro area: 1995-2004 
(growth rates)
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FIGURE 7 - Components of demand in the United States: 1995-2004 
(growth rates)
FIGURE 8 - Real GDP and consumer price inflation in the Western non-euro EU 
Member States: 1995-2004 
(growth rates)
FIGURE 9 - Components of demand in the Western non-euro EU
Member States: 1995-2004 
(growth rates)
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c. Prices
Inflation remained fairly low in Europe and the United States over the 1995-2004
period. In the euro area, the consumer price deflator increased on average by 1.9
per cent per annum between 1995 and 2004, with a high of 3.3 per cent in 1996 and
a trough of 0.4 per cent in 1997.
In the United States, the consumer price deflator increased on average by 1.8 per
cent during the 1995-2000 period and by 1.9 per cent during the 2000-2004 period,
though price inflation showed more volatility over the course of the first period,
reaching a high of 2.2 per cent in 1996 and a low of 0.9 per cent in 1998.
In the Western non-euro EU Member States, consumer price inflation averaged 2.3
per cent per annum over the entire 1995-2004 period, coming out at an average of
2.6 per cent per annum over 1995-2000 and 1.7 per cent over 2001-2004.
d. Interest rates
The short-term interest rate averaged 4.1 per cent in the euro area over the 1995-
2004 period, with a high of 7.1 per cent in 1995 and a low of 2.1 per cent in 2004.
At the same time, the real short-term interest rate - defined as the nominal short-
term interest rate deflated by the GDP deflator - averaged 2.3 per cent per annum,
with a high of 4.8 per cent in 1997 and a low of 0.2 per cent in 2003 and 2004. The
long-term interest rate stood on average at 6.2 per cent over 1995-2000, compared
with 4.5 per cent during the 2001-2004 period (see Figure 10).
In the United States, the short-term interest rate averaged 4.3 per cent over the
whole period, reaching a high of 6.5 per cent in 2000 and a low of 1.2 per cent in
2003 (see Figure 12).
In the Western non-euro EU Member States, the short-term interest rate averaged
5.3 per cent, falling from an average of 6.1 per cent during the 1995-2000 period
to an average of 4.1 per cent during the 2001-2004 period (see Figure 12).
FIGURE 10 - Interest rates in the euro area: 1995-2004 
(levels, in per cent)
  











Nominal short-term interest rate
Real short-term interest rate (deflated by the GDP deflator)
Nominal long-term interest rate
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3. Japan over the 1995-2004 period
Japanese equity prices pursued their downward trend throughout most of the
1995-2004 period, falling at an average annual rate of 1.5 per cent over 1995-2000
and at 8.4 per cent over 2001-2004 (see Figure 13 and Table 7).
Over the 1995-2004 period, consumer prices fell on average by 0.4 per cent per an-
num. At the same time, real GDP grew at an average annual rate of just 1.2 per cent
(see Figure 14 and Table 7). Business sector investment growth in Japan averaged
2.5 per cent per annum, while private consumption increased by 0.9 per cent (see
Figure 15 and Table 7).
FIGURE 11 - Interest rates in the United States: 1995-2004 
(levels, in per cent)
FIGURE 12 - Interest rates in the Western non-euro EU Member States: 
1995-2004 (levels, in per cent)
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The nominal short-term interest rate tended to decline throughout the whole pe-
riod, reaching its lower bound of near-zero as of 2002. However, the decline in
consumer prices as of 1999 pushed real interest rates up above the nominal rates
with the real short-term interest rate averaging 0.8 per cent and reaching a high
of 1.3 per cent in 2002 (see Figure 16 and Table 7).
FIGURE 13 - Asset prices in Japan: 1995-2004 
(growth rates)
FIGURE 14 - Real GDP and consumer price inflation in Japan: 1995-2004 
(growth rates) 
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FIGURE 15 - Components of demand in Japan: 1995-2004 
(growth rates) 
FIGURE 16 - Interest rates in Japan: 1995-2004 
(levels, in per cent)
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4. Detailed tables: The historical macroeconomic baselines of the major 
economic areas over the 1995-2004 period
TABLE 4 - Historical macroeconomic baseline of the euro area: 1995-2004 
(growth rates - unless otherwise indicated)  









Demand/supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption 1.8 1.6 1.5 3.0 3.5 2.8 1.9 0.6 1.1 1.2 1.9 2.4 1.2
Public consumption 0.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.5 3.1 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 2.2
Gross fixed capital formation 2.4 1.3 2.4 5.2 6.0 4.9 -0.3 -2.7 -0.6 1.9 2.1 3.7 -0.4
of which business sector 4.6 2.5 4.4 7.3 7.1 7.4 0.1 -3.0 -1.7 2.3 3.1 5.5 -0.6
Exports (consolidated) 7.6 6.3 12.8 3.5 1.2 18.1 3.6 1.4 -2.1 5.5 5.8 8.3 2.1
Imports (consolidated) 6.8 4.4 10.7 8.4 5.5 16.5 0.6 -0.7 1.1 6.0 5.9 8.7 1.7
Gross domestic product 2.2 1.4 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.6 0.9 0.5 2.0 2.0 2.5 1.3
Gross private sector output 2.9 1.7 3.5 4.0 3.4 5.7 1.5 0.4 0.5 2.8 2.6 3.5 1.3
Contributions to real GDP growth
Total domestic expenditure 2.1 1.0 1.7 3.5 3.4 3.0 0.9 0.3 1.1 2.0 1.9 2.5 1.1
Net exports 0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Deflators
Gross domestic product 2.4 2.8 -0.2 1.2 1.7 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 2.2
Private consumption 2.4 3.3 0.4 0.9 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1
Exports -2.5 2.0 2.0 1.1 0.1 3.3 1.5 0.7 -1.5 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.5
Imports -3.2 1.6 3.2 -1.6 0.4 10.0 0.2 -2.1 -2.8 1.7 0.7 1.7 -0.8
Price of oil (US$ per barrel) 17.1 20.4 19.1 12.7 17.7 28.6 24.4 25.0 28.9 38.3 23.2 19.3 29.1
Labour market
Total employment 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.9 1.8 2.2 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.3 0.7
of which private sector 0.7 0.5 1.0 2.0 1.9 2.3 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.4 0.7
Unemployment rate 
(level, % of labour force)
10.5 10.7 10.6 10.1 9.2 8.2 7.8 8.2 8.7 8.8 9.3 9.9 8.4
Nominal wage, private sector 3.0 3.0 0.3 0.8 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.4
Take home real wage, private sector 0.4 -0.7 -0.2 0.2 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.7
Producer real wage, private sector 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 1.6 -0.4 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.7
Productivity (GDP per employee) 1.6 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.9 1.2 0.5
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) 7.1 5.3 4.6 4.2 3.2 4.5 4.3 3.3 2.3 2.1 4.1 4.8 3.0
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) 8.9 7.4 6.1 4.8 4.6 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.1 4.0 5.5 6.2 4.5
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -13.8 -10.7 -4.2 -6.4 -0.4 10.1 -1.2 -7.8 -12.1 -4.4 -5.1 -4.2 -6.4
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 5.9 4.7 17.8 -1.8 4.0 10.6 1.3 -5.3 -7.5 -2.0 2.8 6.9 -3.4
Stock market indice -6.5 17.0 40.8 40.1 12.0 31.8 -19.2 -23.6 -17.7 20.6 9.5 22.5 -10.0
Deflator of residential buildings 2.3 2.5 1.2 1.6 3.8 5.1 5.3 6.9 6.4 9.3 4.4 2.7 7.0
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) -5.0 -4.3 -2.7 -2.3 -1.3 0.1 -1.7 -2.4 -2.8 -2.7 -2.5 -2.6 -2.4
Government gross debt (% of GDP) 73.1 75.5 75.5 73.9 72.9 70.4 69.6 69.5 70.8 71.2 72.2 73.5 70.3
Household sector
Total real available means 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.4 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3
of which real disposable income 1.9 1.1 0.7 1.8 2.3 2.4 2.6 0.9 0.9 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.6
Net saving by households
(level, % of disposable income)
12.4 12.0 11.3 10.3 9.2 8.9 9.5 9.7 9.6 10.3 10.3 10.7 9.8
International environment
Foreign effective output 4.7 4.9 4.9 3.6 4.0 5.0 2.8 3.3 4.1 5.3 4.3 4.5 3.9
Foreign effective price level 19.8 19.6 25.4 6.0 4.6 3.8 4.1 3.6 3.6 3.6 9.4 13.2 3.7
Foreign effective interest rate (level) 8.3 7.6 8.2 7.8 7.1 7.6 5.2 3.0 2.1 2.6 6.0 7.8 3.2
Current account (level, % of GDP) 0.7 1.1 1.5 0.9 0.5 -0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5Working Paper 17-05
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TABLE 5 - Historical macroeconomic baseline of the Western non-euro EU Member States: 1995-2004 
(growth rates - unless otherwise indicated)  









Demand/supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption 1.5 3.3 3.5 3.6 4.0 4.1 2.3 2.8 2.1 3.1 3.0 3.3 2.6
Public consumption 1.1 1.5 -0.3 1.9 2.9 1.4 2.3 3.2 2.6 3.2 2.0 1.4 2.8
Gross fixed capital formation 5.1 5.3 6.3 11.6 2.5 4.4 2.4 2.2 1.5 5.6 4.7 5.9 2.9
of which business sector 9.1 9.9 9.8 14.4 3.9 5.3 1.5 0.4 -1.5 4.5 5.7 8.7 1.2
Exports (consolidated) 9.5 7.5 8.9 3.8 5.1 10.1 2.9 0.4 1.5 4.0 5.4 7.5 2.2
Imports (consolidated) 6.2 8.4 10.3 9.8 7.0 9.7 4.2 3.4 2.0 5.5 6.6 8.6 3.8
Gross domestic product 3.0 2.5 3.1 2.9 2.7 3.7 1.8 1.3 1.9 2.8 2.6 3.0 1.9
Gross private sector output 4.1 4.0 5.3 5.1 4.1 5.6 2.5 2.0 1.9 3.6 3.8 4.7 2.5
Contributions to real GDP growth
Total domestic expenditure 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.8 3.4 3.8 2.3 2.5 2.2 3.6 3.1 3.4 2.6
Net exports 0.9 -0.2 -0.4 -1.9 -0.7 -0.1 -0.5 -1.2 -0.3 -0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -0.7
Deflators
Gross domestic product 2.1 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.5 2.0 2.3 3.1 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.5
Private consumption 2.4 3.2 3.7 2.5 1.9 1.9 2.4 1.6 1.2 1.5 2.2 2.6 1.7
Exports 2.0 -1.2 -12.0 -5.7 -2.4 -1.4 2.4 1.0 5.4 -1.4 -1.3 -3.4 1.8
Imports 3.9 -2.2 -14.4 -7.2 -2.8 -0.4 2.8 -0.9 4.5 -1.5 -1.8 -3.8 1.2
Price of oil (US$ per barrel) 17.1 20.4 19.1 12.7 17.7 28.6 24.4 25.0 28.9 38.3 23.2 19.3 29.1
Labour market
Total employment 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.2 0.9
of which private sector 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.0
Unemployment rate 
(level, % of labour force)
8.5 8.1 7.1 6.4 6.0 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.0 6.2 6.9 5.0
Nominal wage, private sector 2.2 3.9 6.2 6.2 4.8 6.8 4.7 2.6 2.7 3.6 4.4 5.0 3.4
Take home real wage, private sector -1.0 0.6 3.4 2.5 2.4 4.4 3.0 2.2 1.2 1.4 2.0 2.1 1.9
Producer real wage, private sector -0.4 2.2 8.1 6.4 4.5 5.4 2.0 0.9 0.0 2.6 3.2 4.4 1.4
Productivity (GDP per employee) 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 2.3 0.7 0.3 1.1 2.1 1.5 1.7 1.1
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) 7.0 5.9 6.3 6.7 5.1 5.8 4.8 4.1 3.5 4.1 5.3 6.1 4.1
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) 8.6 7.8 6.9 5.4 5.0 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.8 5.8 6.5 4.8
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -4.9 -6.1 -10.2 -7.0 -2.8 0.5 1.3 -6.0 -2.0 -5.4 -4.3 -5.1 -3.0
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 4.2 4.4 11.2 3.0 3.6 5.7 2.4 -3.9 -4.1 -0.9 2.5 5.3 -1.6
Stock market indice 6.7 14.2 22.7 19.8 11.6 1.4 -12.7 -17.4 -11.8 11.6 4.6 12.8 -7.6
Deflator of residential buildings -1.8 8.1 7.1 14.1 13.3 12.8 6.5 20.4 10.8 10.0 10.1 8.9 11.9
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) -5.6 -3.6 -1.8 0.4 1.4 3.9 1.1 -1.2 -2.5 -2.1 -1.0 -0.9 -1.2
Government gross debt (% of GDP) 58.0 57.9 55.0 51.6 48.6 44.3 41.4 40.9 41.9 43.0 48.3 52.6 41.8
Household sector
Total real available means 2.0 2.9 5.3 3.2 5.3 2.6 1.4 3.6 4.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.1
of which real disposable income 2.2 2.2 2.9 0.5 2.3 4.4 4.4 1.7 2.6 3.1 2.6 2.4 2.9
Net saving by households
(level, % of disposable income)
6.2 5.2 4.7 1.7 0.1 0.4 2.4 1.3 1.8 1.8 2.6 3.1 1.8
International environment
Foreign effective output 4.1 3.8 4.4 3.7 3.9 5.5 2.3 2.3 3.1 4.6 3.8 4.2 3.1
Foreign effective price level 11.7 9.8 9.0 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.0 3.3 5.6 7.1 3.2
Foreign effective interest rate (level) 6.8 5.7 5.5 5.2 4.5 5.6 4.1 2.5 1.7 1.9 4.4 5.6 2.5
Current account (level, % of GDP) -0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.0 -1.4 -1.3 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6Working Paper 17-05
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TABLE 6 - Historical macroeconomic baseline of the United States: 1995-2004
(growth rates - unless otherwise indicated)  









Demand/supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption 2.7 3.4 3.8 5.0 5.1 4.7 2.5 3.1 3.3 3.8 3.7 4.1 3.2
Public consumption 0.1 0.5 1.4 1.7 3.3 1.9 3.3 4.4 3.2 2.3 2.2 1.5 3.3
Gross fixed capital formation 6.2 8.4 8.8 9.3 8.3 6.1 -1.9 -3.5 4.4 8.8 5.5 7.8 1.9
of which business sector 10.2 8.9 11.6 10.6 8.8 8.0 -4.1 -8.3 3.7 10.4 6.0 9.7 0.4
Exports 10.1 8.4 11.9 2.4 4.3 8.7 -5.4 -2.4 1.9 8.5 4.9 7.6 0.7
Imports 8.0 8.7 13.6 11.6 11.5 13.1 -2.7 3.4 4.4 9.9 8.2 11.1 3.8
Gross domestic product 2.5 3.7 4.5 4.2 4.5 3.7 0.8 1.9 3.1 4.5 3.3 3.9 2.5
Gross private sector output 3.4 4.7 6.0 5.4 5.7 5.3 -0.0 2.0 3.4 5.6 4.1 5.1 2.7
Contributions to real GDP growth
Total domestic expenditure 2.4 3.9 4.9 5.4 5.6 4.6 0.9 2.5 3.5 5.2 3.9 4.5 3.0
Net exports 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -1.3 -1.2 -1.0 -0.2 -0.9 -0.5 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6
Deflators
Gross domestic product 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.1 1.4 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 2.0
Private consumption 2.1 2.2 1.7 0.9 1.7 2.5 2.1 1.4 1.9 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9
Exports 2.3 -1.3 -1.7 -2.3 -0.6 1.7 -0.4 -0.3 2.1 3.5 0.3 -0.3 1.2
Imports 2.7 -1.8 -3.6 -5.4 0.6 4.2 -2.5 -1.2 3.4 5.0 0.1 -0.5 1.2
Price of oil (US$ per barrel) 17.1 20.4 19.1 12.7 17.7 28.6 24.4 25.0 28.9 38.3 23.2 19.3 29.1
Labour market
Total employment 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.2 -0.1 -0.8 0.0 1.1 1.3 2.1 0.1
of which private sector 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.2 -0.5 -1.3 0.0 1.1 1.3 2.3 -0.2
Unemployment rate 
(level, % of labour force)
5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.8 5.5
Nominal wage, private sector 2.7 2.7 3.9 5.2 4.3 5.9 2.6 2.6 3.7 4.6 3.8 4.1 3.4
Take home real wage, private sector 0.1 -0.5 1.2 3.5 2.2 2.7 1.1 4.9 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.5 2.7
Producer real wage, private sector 0.4 1.2 2.9 4.9 2.9 3.5 0.8 1.8 1.6 2.1 2.2 2.6 1.6
Productivity (GDP per employee) 0.6 2.0 2.3 1.8 2.3 1.4 0.8 2.7 3.1 3.3 2.0 1.8 2.5
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) 6.0 5.5 5.7 5.5 5.4 6.5 3.8 1.8 1.2 1.6 4.3 5.8 2.1
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) 6.7 6.5 6.5 5.3 5.6 6.0 5.0 4.6 4.0 4.3 5.5 6.1 4.5
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -2.6 -6.6 -8.2 -10.2 -5.3 -4.6 -6.1 -4.8 6.0 4.5 -3.8 -6.2 -0.1
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 9.3 4.1 0.3 -2.7 0.1 -2.5 -1.9 -0.9 7.7 4.8 1.8 1.4 2.4
Stock market indice 17.7 23.8 30.3 24.3 22.2 7.6 -16.3 -16.7 -3.1 17.2 10.7 21.0 -4.7
Deflator of residential buildings 4.6 3.2 4.5 5.0 8.2 6.3 7.5 9.0 9.6 10.1 6.8 5.3 9.0
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) -3.2 -2.2 -0.8 0.4 0.9 1.6 -0.4 -3.8 -4.6 -4.4 -1.6 -0.5 -3.3
Government gross debt (% of GDP) 74.8 74.0 71.4 68.2 64.5 58.6 58.3 60.5 62.9 63.8 65.7 68.6 61.4
Household sector
Total real available means 3.1 2.4 3.3 3.0 4.6 0.3 1.6 3.9 5.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 3.5
of which real disposable income 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.9 4.3 3.3 2.6 4.4 3.6 4.2 3.5 3.4 3.7
Net saving by households
(level, % of disposable income)
5.1 4.8 4.5 3.4 2.6 1.3 1.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.2 3.6 2.5
International environment
Foreign effective output 4.7 4.8 4.6 3.1 3.7 5.4 2.9 3.1 4.1 5.2 4.2 4.4 3.8
Foreign effective price level 14.8 10.0 7.3 5.9 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.7 6.2 7.8 3.8
Foreign effective interest rate (level) 5.6 4.7 4.7 4.6 3.8 4.7 3.2 1.7 1.2 1.5 3.6 4.7 1.9
Current account (level, % of GDP) -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 -2.2 -3.0 -4.1 -3.7 -4.4 -4.7 -5.4 -3.1 -2.2 -4.5Working Paper 17-05
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TABLE 7 - Historical macroeconomic baseline of Japan: 1995-2004 
(growth rates - unless otherwise indicated)  









Demand/supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption 1.9 2.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.0 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.2 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.8
Public consumption 4.4 3.0 1.1 2.2 4.7 4.9 3.0 2.6 1.2 2.7 3.0 3.4 2.4
Gross fixed capital formation 0.9 6.4 0.8 -3.8 -1.2 2.0 -1.4 -5.7 0.9 1.6 0.1 0.9 -1.2
of which business sector 2.4 4.4 10.9 -1.6 -4.5 8.6 0.7 -7.0 5.8 5.5 2.5 3.4 1.3
Exports 4.3 6.2 11.3 -2.4 1.5 12.1 -6.0 7.3 9.1 14.3 5.8 5.5 6.2
Imports 13.3 12.9 0.7 -6.7 3.7 8.5 -0.7 1.3 3.8 8.9 4.5 5.4 3.3
Gross domestic product 2.0 3.4 1.8 -1.0 -0.1 2.4 0.2 -0.3 1.4 2.7 1.2 1.4 1.0
Gross private sector output 2.7 4.3 1.6 -1.7 -0.0 2.8 0.0 -0.3 1.5 3.4 1.4 1.6 1.2
Contributions to real GDP growth
Total domestic expenditure 2.5 3.9 0.7 -1.4 0.0 1.9 0.7 -1.0 0.7 1.9 1.0 1.3 0.6
Net exports -0.5 -0.4 1.0 0.3 -0.1 0.6 -0.6 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.4
Deflators
Gross domestic product -0.6 -0.8 0.4 -0.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.3 -1.3 -1.4 -1.2 -0.9 -0.7 -1.3
Private consumption -0.4 -0.1 1.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.9
Exports -2.0 3.2 1.6 0.6 -8.5 -3.7 1.2 -1.0 -3.3 -1.6 -1.4 -1.5 -1.2
Imports -1.7 8.8 6.3 -2.8 -8.5 2.2 3.8 -1.2 -0.8 2.2 0.8 0.7 1.0
Price of oil (US$ per barrel) 17.1 20.4 19.1 12.7 17.7 28.6 24.4 25.0 28.9 38.3 23.2 19.3 29.1
Labour market
Total employment 0.1 0.4 1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.0 -0.5
of which private sector 0.1 0.4 1.1 -0.7 -0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.5
Unemployment rate 
(level, % of labour force)
3.1 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.3 4.7 4.4 3.9 5.1
Nominal wage, private sector 1.4 0.6 1.4 -0.2 -1.1 0.1 -0.5 -1.7 -0.6 -1.2 -0.2 0.4 -1.0
Take home real wage, private sector 2.2 0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.3 0.3 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 -1.3 0.2 0.6 -0.4
Producer real wage, private sector 2.3 0.7 0.4 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.5 -0.6 0.4 -0.4 0.6 1.0 -0.0
Productivity (GDP per employee) 1.9 3.0 0.7 -0.4 0.7 2.5 0.8 1.1 1.7 2.5 1.4 1.4 1.5
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.1
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) 3.3 3.0 2.2 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.2 1.2
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -9.0 11.3 5.1 1.9 -16.4 -9.2 9.0 0.6 -3.1 -3.7 -1.4 -2.7 0.7
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 1.8 15.3 8.9 4.9 -5.4 -2.5 11.2 4.5 3.4 1.1 4.3 3.8 5.0
Stock market indice -13.1 21.7 -12.8 -16.5 9.5 2.0 -29.5 -16.3 -8.0 20.1 -4.3 -1.5 -8.4
Deflator of residential buildings -3.7 -1.0 -1.3 -2.9 -2.9 -3.9 -5.9 -4.6 -5.0 -3.8 -3.5 -2.6 -4.8
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) -4.7 -5.1 -3.8 -10.8 -7.2 -7.5 -6.1 -7.9 -7.7 -7.0 -6.8 -6.5 -7.2
Government gross debt (% of GDP) 87.1 93.9 100.3 112.2 125.7 134.1 142.3 149.5 157.5 163.2 126.6 108.9 153.1
Household sector
Total real available means 1.5 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.8 -0.0 -0.5 1.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.3
of which real disposable income 1.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 -0.6 -0.9 -2.2 1.1 0.5 1.8 0.2 0.2 0.3
Net saving by households
(level, % of disposable income)
12.6 10.6 10.6 11.3 10.8 9.5 6.5 7.1 7.3 7.6 9.4 10.9 7.2
International environment
Foreign effective output 4.2 4.5 5.2 4.3 4.6 5.5 1.8 2.6 3.7 5.3 4.2 4.7 3.3
Foreign effective price level 9.7 6.9 5.3 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.2 4.5 5.4 3.1
Foreign effective interest rate (level) 6.4 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.1 6.2 4.1 2.2 1.5 1.8 4.4 5.8 2.4
Current account (level, % of GDP) 2.1 1.4 2.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.8 3.2 3.7 2.6 2.3 2.9Working Paper 17-05
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B.Asset price inflation and interest rate rules
This section examines to what extent short-term interest rate policy might have
been affected by changes in asset prices in the past.
1. The Taylor rule
The Taylor rule has become a conventional tool for the study of monetary policy
(see Taylor (1993)). According to this rule, the monetary authorities increase (de-
crease) the nominal short-term interest rate more than proportionally in response
to increases (decreases) in inflation, thereby increasing (decreasing) real interest
rates as inflationary pressures rise (fall). Under a Taylor rule the monetary author-
ities also keep the short-term interest rate below (above) the equilibrium interest
rate if demand is below (above) potential output.
In its general form, the Taylor rule reads as:
(1)  SI = HP_LI + si_1 (INFL_PCH - TARGETINFL_PCH) + si_2 OUTPUTGAP
where SI is the nominal short-term interest rate, HP_LI the equilibrium nominal
interest rate, OUTPUTGAP the output gap, INFL_PCH consumer price inflation
and TARGETINFL_PCH the target inflation rate. A useful benchmark for the pa-
rameter values is provided in Taylor (1993), in which parameter values of 0.5 for
si_1 and of 1.5 for si_2 are suggested for the US economy.
In the default version of the NIME model, interest rate changes are smoothed by
embedding the Taylor rule (1) in a partial adjustment scheme, so that the interest
rate rule reads as:
(2)  SI = si_sl (HP_LI + si_1 (INFL_PCH - TARGETINFL_PCH) + si_2 OUTPUTGAP)
  - (1-si_sl) SI-1 
with 0 si_sl 1.
2. Asset prices and interest rate responses in the past
In this section, we test the hypothesis that monetary authorities of the major eco-
nomic areas targeted only the output gap and consumer price inflation (while
smoothing interest rate changes), against the alternative hypothesis that they tar-
geted the output gap, consumer price inflation as well as a measure of asset price
inflation (while smoothing interest rate changes). We do this by adding to equa-
tion (2) a variable capturing the change in equity prices (relative to a targeted
change), as well as a variable capturing the change in the price of residential
buildings (relative to a targeted change).
≤≤Working Paper 17-05
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We estimated the following equation:
(3)  SI = si_sl (HP_LI + si_1 (INFL_PCH - TARGETINFL_PCH) + si_2 OUTPUTGAP)
  - (1-si_sl) SI-1
+ si_s3 (INFL_PCAOE - TARGETINFL_PCAOE) 
+ si_s4 (INFL_PCIR - TARGETINFL_PCIR)
+ SI_V
where the variable INFL_PCAOE is a measure of the increase in the equity price,
INFL_PCIR is a measure of the increase in the price of residential buildings,
TARGET_PCAOE is the targeted increase in price of equity, and TARGET_PCIR is
the targeted increase in the price of residential buildings. The targeted price in-
creases, as well as the equilibrium interest rate, are obtained by applying a
Hodrick-Prescott filter to the corresponding historical series (see also figures 17
and 18). The variable SI_V is a stochastic variable capturing randomness in hu-
man behaviour.
The parameters si_s3 and si_s4 are expected not to be significantly different from
zero1, indicating that asset price inflation was not a significant determinant of
past monetary policy.
Table 5 shows the instrumental variables estimation results for the period 1975-
2004 of equation (3). Clearly, the point estimates for si_s3 and si_s4 in Table 5 sup-
port the hypothesis that asset price inflation was not a major concern of the
monetary authorities in setting past interest rate policy.
1. HO: si_s3 = si_s4 = 0
H1: si_s3, si_s4 > 0
FIGURE 17 - The composite stock market indice in the euro area: 1970-2004












Composite stock market index: level 
Composite stock market index: trend levelWorking Paper 17-05
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TABLE 8 - Estimation results for equation (3)  
The hypothesis that monetary authorities did not explicitly take asset price infla-
tion into account in implementing their interest rate policy is also supported by
statements made by various leading central bankers. For example, Federal Re-
serve Chairman Greenspan (2004) states: “There is little dispute that the prices of
stocks, bonds, homes, real estate, and exchange rates affect GDP. But most central
banks have chosen, at least to date, not to view asset prices as targets of policy, but as eco-
nomic variables to be considered through the prism of the policy's ultimate
objective.” (italics added). On the side of the ECB, President Duisenberg (2003),
declared: “However, the importance of asset price bubbles and their potentially distort-
ing impact on economic and financial processes does not mean that central banks should
make asset prices an explicit goal for their monetary policies. This idea has been refuted
by many, and rightfully so. Asset prices are predominantly driven by real factors
such as technological and demographic developments and preferences, which
cannot be controlled by monetary policy.” (italics added).
FIGURE 18 - The S&P500 indice in the United States: 1970-2004
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si_s1 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
- . -- . -- . -- . -
si_s2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
- . -- . -- . -- . -
si_sl 0.31 0.44 0.33 0.52
(0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.09)
si_s3 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01)
si_s4 0.26 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04
(0.34) (0.10) (0.21) (0.05)
R2-adjusted 0.85 0.76 0.78 0.86
Durbin Watson 1.42 1.44 1.14 1.00
Note: sample size from 1975 until 2004, standard errors between brackets.
Instrumental variables estimation. Instruments include for each area its equilibrium interest rate,
lagged inflation rate, lagged output gap, lagged interest rate, lagged asset prices and the contempo-
raneous trend asset prices (Japan: ordinary least squares estimates).Working Paper 17-05
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III Results of the counterfactual simulation for 
the 1995-2004 period
The discussion presented in the previous chapter indicates that in the past, the
monetary authorities of the major economic areas did not target asset price infla-
tion in a systematic way when setting the short-term interest rates. In this chapter,
we present results from a simulation carried out with the NIME model on how the
main macroeconomic aggregates of the major economic areas of the world might
have evolved over the 1995-2004 period had the central banks of these areas in-
cluded asset price inflation in their interest rate rule.
In the first section of this chapter, we specify an alternative interest rate rule,
based on a broad price index and a functional form similar to the standard Taylor
rule. The use of such a broader price index is motivated by the fact that the house-
hold sector’s intertemporal (indirect) utility depends not only on
contemporaneous prices and income, but also on future prices and income. In the
second section, we present the results of a counterfactual simulation based on the
broad-based interest rate rule specified in the first section.
A.A broad-based interest rate rule
In this section, we specify a broader-based interest rate rule. Our starting point is
the assumption that household utility depends not only on the contemporaneous
consumption of goods and services, but also on the contemporaneous consump-
tion of other services (such as liquidity services generated by currency balances
or housing services rendered by real estate) as well as the future consumption of
these goods and services. Consequently, any price index which measures the wel-
fare cost of price changes should reflect the depth of these choices.
1. The intertemporal allocation problem of the household sector
In the NIME model, the household sector allocates its total available means over
goods and services, money balances (which generate liquidity services), residen-
tial buildings (which provide housing services) and financial assets (other than
money, which provide future purchasing power), maximizing its intertemporal
utility subject to its intertemporal budget constraint.
In Appendix A of Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2000.a), it is shown that the in-
tertemporal optimization problem of the household sector can be characterised in
terms of a goods vector Y:Working Paper 17-05
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(4.a)  = (CPO,  , CIRO, Z) 
and a price vector  : 
(4.b)  = (PCH,  PCH,   PCIR,
) 
where CPO is private consumption, M nominal money balances, PCH the consum-
er price, CIRO the stock of residential buildings, Z assets generating future
purchasing power, LIC an interest rate1, PCIR the price of residential buildings,
and   the rate of depreciation of residential buildings. The variable Z, measur-
ing future purchasing power, is defined as:
(4.c) Z = (M+CIRO PCIR+1+ INVHO  PINVH+1 
+ CAOU (1+LIC) + ZY+1)/PCH+1
where INVHO is inventories held by households, PINVH the price of inventories,
CAOU the stock of financial assets (equity and bonds) and ZY is expected future
non-asset income2.
For notational convenience, we rewrite the price vector in short-hand notation
as3:
(4.d) = (PCH, PM, USERIR, PZ).
The interpretation of the prices in equations (4.b) and (4.d) are as follows (see also
Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2000.a)). In order to acquire one unit of real mon-
ey balances, M/PCH, one has to spend PCH units of the currency. By holding PCH
units of money instead of an interest-bearing financial asset, one foregoes a yield
equal to LIC PCH. The present value of this is: 
PM =   PCH. 
1. LIC is a weighted average of the short-term and long-term interest rate.
2. In Meyermans and van Brusselen (2000.a) it was assumed that real estate, bonds, and human capital are perfect
substitutes. In this Working Paper, we relax this assumption. See Appendix B.
3. We define:
PM =  PCH 
USERIR =   PCIR
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The interpretation of the user cost of residential buildings, USERIR, is as follows.
Buying one unit of housing costs PCIR. Using this house during one period will
depreciate its value by gir_rh per cent, so that one will get a price equal to
 when one sells that house in the next period. The present value
of the latter is equal to  . In other words, the user cost of
owning the house during one period is equal to: 
USERIR = PCIR -  
which can also be rewritten as: 
USERIR =  PCIR.
Finally, bonds1 are a means of transferring purchasing power from one period to
another. Bonds have an interest rate equal to LIC. The expected purchasing power
in the next period of one unit bought today is equal to (1+LIC)/PCH+1. Hence, if
one wants to obtain one real unit of purchasing power in the next period by hold-
ing bonds, one has to pay today the unit price:
PZ = . 
2. An overall price index within an alternative interest rate rule
Given that household utility depends on the consumption of a broad range of
goods and services, as reflected in the quantity and price vectors (4.a) and (4.b),
the appropriate price index of the household sector, P, is defined as:
(5.a) ln(P) = w_cpo ln(PCH) + w_m ln(PM) + w_ciro ln(USERIR)+ w_z ln(PZ)
with the weights satisfying: 
(5.b) 0<w_cpo, w_m, w_ciro, w_z <1, 
and
(5.c) w_cpo+ w_m + w_ciro + w_z = 1.
1. “Bonds” refers here to all other assets of the household sector. 
PCIR+1 1 gir_rh – ()
PCIR+1 1 gir_rh – ()
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Taking first differences of equation (5.a), the overall rate of inflation, INFL, is then
equal to:
(6) INFL = d ln(P)
= w_cpo d ln(PCH) + w_m d ln(PM) + w_ciro d ln(USERIR)+ w_z d ln(PZ)
In Section 1 of Appendix B, the definition of the broad price index is refined even
further by assuming that bonds, equities and real estate are imperfect
substitutes1.
If we now define the interest rule (2) of the previous chapter in terms of the
change in the broader price index, we obtain:
(7)  SI = si_sl (HP_LI + si_1 OUTPUTGAP + si_2 (INFL - TARGETINFL)) - (1-si_sl) SI-1
with INFL defined in equation (6) and TARGETINFL obtained by evaluating equa-
tion (6) for the targets of the individual components.
As shown in Section 2 of Appendix B, replacing INFL and TARGETINFL in equa-
tion (7) by the expression in equation (6), and using equations (4.b) and (4.d), as
well as equations (A.6) and (A.7) of Appendix A2, and rearranging terms, we
obtain:
(8) SI = si_sl {HP_LI+ si_1 [d ln(PCH) - G_PCH] + si_2 OUTPUTGAP}- (1- si_sl ) SI-1
+ si_sl si_s1 {p_1 [d LIC - d HP_LI]
+ p_2 [d ln   - GQ_PCIR]
+ p_3 (1-pch_sl) (pch_sw-1) pch_s1 d OUTPUTGAP
+p_4 (1-pcir_sl) (pcir_sw-1) [d ln(PCIR)-(G_PCH+GQ_PCIR)]
+ p_5 (1-pcaoe_sl) (pcaoe_sw-1) [d ln(PCAOE) - G_PCAOE]
- p_3 pch_sl d G_PCH
+ p_4 [(1-pcir_sl) pcir_sw -1] d (G_PCH+GQ_PCIR)
+ p_5 [(1-pcaoe_sl) pcaoe_sw -1] d G_PCAOE}
+  SI_V
1. See equations (B.6.a)-(B.6.c) of Appendix B: 
ln(PZ) = wz_zy ln  + wz_ciro ln  + wz_cooe ln
with 0< wz_zy, wz_ciro, wz_cooe < 1 and wz_zy +wz_ciro + wz_cooe =1.
2. Equations (A.6) and (A.7) of Appendix A describe changes in equity prices and real estate prices, respectively.
PCH+1
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where G_PCH is the targeted change in the consumer prices, GQ_PCIR the targeted
change in the real price of residential buildings, G_PCAOE the targeted change in
equity prices, and HP_LI the equilibrium nominal interest rate. For purposes of
empirical estimation, the targets are obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott fil-
ter to the corresponding historical series.
Equation (8) indicates that the monetary authorities not only target consumer
price inflation, the output gap and the long-term interest rate, but also changes in
the output gap, changes in the real price of residential buildings, changes in the
long-term interest rate, changes in equity prices and changes in real estate prices1.
Indeed, if asset prices rise above (fall below) their fundamentals, households tend
to consume more (less) than if equity prices increase in line with their fundamen-
tals. However, if asset prices rise above (drop below) their fundamentals, a future
fall (rise) in asset prices will be necessary to restore stock market equilibrium and
this future correction in asset prices will bring about a drop (increase) in con-
sumption. Policy makers must weigh the contemporaneous gains (losses) from
an excessive increase (decrease) in asset prices against the future losses (gains) en-
tailed by the necessary subsequent correction of asset prices; by limiting the
fluctuations of asset prices around their fundamentals, monetary authorities re-
duce fluctuations in household consumption expenditures. In addition, the short-
term interest rate will also be increased (decreased) pre-emptively when the out-
put gap narrows (widens) as this change in the output gap will cause higher
(lower) inflation in the future. Finally, equation (8) also indicates that a change in
the targets gives rise to a (temporary) change in the short-term interest rate.
The parameters of interest rate rule (8) are determined by the parameters of the
original Taylor rule (i.e. the parameters si_s1, si_s2 and si_sl), the budget shares
of the various expenditure items in the household budget (i.e. the parameters p1,
..., p5) and the parameters of the price equations2. The parameter values of equa-
tion (8) are summarised in Table 9. Of particular interest are the numbers in the
third last row which show that in the euro area a 1 per cent increase (above the
targeted increase) in equity prices would induce a 0.2 percentage-point increase
in the short-term interest rate in the medium run and an increase of 0.1 percent-
age-point (=0.2 x si_sl x si_s1) on impact 3.
1. Note that equation (8) encompasses a traditional Taylor rule. Indeed, if p1=...=p5=0, we obtain equation (2); if
we also set si_sl equal to zero, we obtain equation (1).
2. The parameters 0<pch_sl, pch_sw<1 refer to the price-setting scheme of PCH, whereby parameter px_sl is the
fraction of the composite private consumption good for which the price is kept at its preceding price due to
menu costs, and the parameter px_sw is the fraction of the composite price that is revised according to a rule-
of-thumb due to information costs. Similar considerations hold for 0<pcir_sl, pcir_sw, pcaoe_sl, and
pcaoe_sw<1. See also Appendix A.
3. Bernanke and Gertler (2001), for instance, suggest a parameter value ranging between 0 and 0.2 . Working Paper 17-05
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TABLE 9 - Parameter values for the augmented Taylor rule (equation 8)  
B.Main results of the counterfactual simulation
In this section, we present the main results of a counterfactual simulation based
on the alternative interest rate rule as derived in equation (8).
The counterfactual simulation is carried out as follows. First, we use the default
version of the NIME model to perform a within-sample simulation for the 1995-
2004 period. This default version of the model includes, for each of the four major
economic areas of the world an interest rate rule driven by a consumer price in-
flation target, an output gap, and the lagged short-term interest rate (see equation
2). Next, we calculate the forecast error of each behavioural equation for each ob-
servation unit. Finally, for each of the major economic areas, we replace the
traditional interest rate rule (2) by the new broader-based interest rate rule (8) and
we re-run the NIME model over the period 1995-2004, adding the error terms cal-
culated in the first round to the behavioural equations.1
The main results of this counterfactual simulation are given in figures 19 to 34 and
in tables 10 to 13. The numbers in these figures and tables are deviations from the
historical baseline level in per cent, unless otherwise specified.
1. The euro area
Table 10 and figures 19 to 22 summarise the results of the counterfactual simula-
tion for the euro area.
In the counterfactual simulation, the short-term interest rate of the euro area rises
well above the historical baseline from 1997 to 2000, reaching a high of 0.9 per-
centage-point above the baseline in 2000. These interest rate hikes are a direct
response of monetary policy to the sharp rise in equity prices, with the composite
euro area stock market index increasing on average by 31.2 per cent per annum.





si_s1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
si_s2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
si_sl 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5
p1 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9
p2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
p3 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
 
p3*(1-pch_sl)*(pch_sw-1)*pch_s1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4
p4*(1-pcir_sl)*(pcir_sw-1) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
p5*(1-pcaoe_sl)*(pcaoe_sw-1) 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
p4*((1-pcir_sl)*pcir_sw-1) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
p5*((1-pcaoe_sl)*pcaoe_sw-1) 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
Source: Table 17, Appendix B.
1. The short-term interest rate of the rest of the world bloc follows the US short-term interest rate.
The values for trend productivity, the equilibrium real interest rate, secular inflation, population growth, tax
rates and US dollar denominated oil prices are kept at their historical level. Working Paper 17-05
31
After 2000, as equity prices fall, the counterfactual short-term interest rate drops
and comes out at 0.9 percentage-point below baseline in 2003 and 0.3 percentage-
point below baseline in 2004.
Assuming that the dividend outlook which underpinned the historical move-
ments in equity prices is exogenous and that asset prices are equal to the present
value of these dividends, asset prices are primarily affected by the rate at which
the future dividends are discounted. As a consequence, equity prices in the coun-
terfactual simulation fall below their baseline level between 1997 and 2000, as
interest rates rise above baseline, and equity prices rise above baseline as of 2001,
as interest rates fall below their baseline level.
As the interest rate hikes in the euro area are initially somewhat smaller than the
rate increases elsewhere in the world, the euro area’s nominal effective exchange
rate depreciates with respect to the historical baseline, falling by 0.5 per cent be-
low baseline in 1999. As of 2001, the euro interest rate falls below its baseline level
and its fall is more pronounced than the rate reductions elsewhere in the world,
leading to a continued depreciation of the euro area’s nominal effective exchange
rate relative to the historical baseline.
The various components of domestic demand are directly affected by the changes
in interest rates. From 1997 to 2000, private consumption falls 0.4 per cent below
baseline, primarily because the interest rate hikes reduce household wealth and
raise the incentive to save. As of 2001, as interest rates fall below the euro area’s
historical baseline, private consumption rebounds and comes out 0.6 per cent
above baseline in 2003 and 0.4 per cent above baseline in 2004. Business sector in-
vestment is also affected by the changes in interest rates, directly by changes in
the user cost of capital and indirectly by changes in the output level. As interest
rates rise over the latter part of the 1990s, business sector investment falls and
comes out at 1.1 per cent below the historical baseline in 2000. However, the sub-
sequent interest rate cuts then raise enterprise sector investment by 1.8 per cent
above baseline in 2003 and by 1.3 per cent above baseline in 2004.
Exports remain almost unaffected over the first years of the counterfactual simu-
lation, as the positive effects of the real exchange rate depreciation and the
negative effects of the decline in foreign effective demand roughly cancel each
other out. However, as of 2002, the euro area’s real effective exchange rate depre-
ciation and the rise in the area’s foreign effective demand push exports 0.4 per
cent above baseline. Over the 1997-2001 period, imports move in line with the ex-
change rate depreciation and the weaker domestic demand, falling 0.5 per cent
below the historical baseline in 2000. However, as of 2002, interest rates are cut,
domestic activity rebounds above its baseline level and euro area imports come
out 0.4 per cent above baseline in 2003 and 2004.
During the 1995-2000 period, the impact of lower domestic demand on real GDP
is mitigated by the positive evolution of the area’s consolidated net exports, and
real GDP falls by no more than 0.3 per cent below baseline. In 2001, as nominal in-
terest rates fall below their historical baseline, domestic demand is bolstered and
real GDP increases to 0.6 per cent above the historical baseline in 2003 and 0.4 per
cent in 2004.Working Paper 17-05
32
Table 2 indicates that, on balance, the implementation of the alternative broad-
based interest rate rule would have raised the euro area’s GDP level by approxi-
mately 0.3 per cent by the end of the 1995-2004 period1. Of the main components
of aggregate demand, private consumption would have been least affected over
the whole period, as its cumulative deviation from baseline amounts to only 0.1
per cent; the effect would have been the greatest on the area’s net exports, pro-
ducing a cumulative deviation of up to 1.3 per cent above baseline.
Throughout the simulation period, the general price level, labour demand and
real wages would have been relatively unaffected.
1. Measured as the discounted cumulative deviation from the baseline level.
FIGURE 19 - Interest and exchange rates in the euro area: counterfactual
outcome for the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline) 
FIGURE 20 - Asset prices in the euro area: counterfactual outcome
for the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
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2. The Western non-euro EU Member States
Table 11 and figures 23 to 26 show the results for the Western non-euro EU Mem-
ber States. This area comprises Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
In the Western non-euro EU Member States, the short-term interest rate rises
above its historical baseline as of 1996, reaching a maximum deviation of 0.6 per-
centage-point from 1998 to 2000. As of 2001, the short-term interest rate falls
below its historical baseline, reaching its largest deviation from baseline in 2003
with a 0.3 percentage-point decline. These relatively limited rate cuts compared
with those in both the United States and the euro area, are explained not only by
the smaller response of the monetary authorities to changes in equity prices (see
Table 9) but also by the relatively stronger surge in real estate prices in this area.
FIGURE 21 - Macroeconomic aggregates in the euro area: counterfactual 
outcome for the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
FIGURE 22 - Components of aggregate demand in the euro area: counterfactual 
outcome for the 1994-2004 period
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
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Initially, the interest rate hikes are not big enough to prevent the effective nominal
exchange rate from depreciating relative to its historical baseline; the decline
reaches 2.6 per cent in 2000. However, as of 2003, the nominal effective exchange
rate appreciates by up to 0.9 per cent relative to its baseline, reflecting smaller cuts
in the domestic interest rate than in foreign interest rates.
The initial interest rate hikes reduce private consumption, which falls to 0.4 per
cent below baseline between 1998 and 2000. As of 2001, interest rates are cut only
marginally relative to their baseline, leaving private consumption to settle also at
levels very close to its historical baseline. Business sector investment falls to 0.4
per cent below its historical baseline in 1998 and 1999; it then recovers gradually,
reaching 0.3 per cent above baseline in 2003.
Initially, the area’s consolidated exports benefit from the exchange rate deprecia-
tion and rise by up to 1 per cent above baseline in 2002. However, as of 2003, the
nominal effective exchange rate begins to appreciate and exports lose much of
their gains, receding to only 0.1 per cent above baseline in 2004. Initially, imports
remain fairly close to their baseline level, but jump to 0.6 per cent above baseline
in 2003 as domestic activity recovers and the exchange rate appreciates relative to
the baseline.
Throughout the simulation period, labour demand, real wages and prices remain
relatively unaffected by the alternative interest rate rule.
Table 2 indicates that the implementation of the alternative interest rate rule
would have reduced the cumulative level of private consumption by a whole 1
per cent below its historical baseline level at the end of the simulation period.
However, it would also have pushed the cumulative level of the area’s net exports
up 3.4 per cent above baseline, leaving the area’s aggregate real GDP level 0.2 per
cent above baseline at the end of the period.
FIGURE 23 - Interest and exchange rates in the Western non-euro EU Member 
States: counterfactual outcome for the 1994-2004 period
(deviation from historical baseline)
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FIGURE 24 - Asset prices in the Western non-euro EU Member States:
counterfactual outcome for the 1994-2004 period
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent) 
FIGURE 25 - Macroeconomic aggregates in the Western non-euro EU Member 
States: counterfactual outcome for the 1994-2004 period
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent) 
 
FIGURE 26 - Components of aggregate demand in the Western non-euro EU
Member States: counterfactual outcome for the 1994-2004 period
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
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3. The United States
Table 12 and figures 27 to 30 present the main counterfactual simulation results
for the United States.
Under the alternative interest rate rule, the US short-term interest rate rises above
its historical baseline over the 1995-2000 period. The short-term rate reaches a
maximum deviation of 1.4 percentage-points above baseline in 1999. From 2001
to 2004, the short-term interest rate comes out below its historical baseline level,
hitting a trough of 0.8 percentage-point below baseline in 2002.
The stronger rise in interest rates rise in the United States than in the other major
economic areas between 1997 to 2000 leads to a 1.7 per cent appreciation of the US
nominal effective exchange rate relative to its historical baseline level in 2000.
However, as of 2001, interest rates are also cut more aggressively in the US than in
the rest of the world. This leads to a gradual depreciation of the dollar, with the
nominal effective exchange rate falling by 0.3 per cent against its baseline level in
2002. The stock market index falls as interest rates rise but the course is reversed
in 2001, as interest rates begin to fall below baseline.
Private consumption falls below its baseline level between 1995 and 2000, reach-
ing a low point of 0.7 per cent below the historical baseline in 1999. As of 2001, the
relative decline in nominal interest rates provides a boost to private consumption,
which comes out 0.6 per cent above baseline in 2003. Total gross fixed capital for-
mation falls by 1 per cent below baseline in 1998 and 1999, only to rebound to 1.7
per cent above baseline in 2002 and to 0.8 per cent above baseline in 2004.
From 1995 to 2002, the counterfactual rise in US interest rates leads to an appreci-
ation of the dollar which, along with the reduction in foreign effective demand,
drives exports down below their historical baseline level. The deviation between
the counterfactual simulation and the historical baseline is largest in 2000, when
exports lie 1.2 per cent below baseline. As of 2003, exports jump above baseline
as economic activity in the rest of the world rebounds relative to its historical
baseline level, and as the appreciation of the dollar becomes less marked. Be-
tween 1995 and 2001, imports come out below their baseline level primarily due
to the fall in domestic activity. As of 2002, imports rise above baseline, following
the relative pick-up in GDP growth.
With declining net exports and falling domestic demand over the 1995-2000 peri-
od, US real GDP falls to 0.4 per cent below baseline in 1997 and reaches 0.7 per cent
below baseline in 1999. However, as of 2001, interest rates are cut sharply, allow-
ing for a recovery in real GDP, which rises to 0.7 per cent above baseline in 2001
and to 0.4 per cent above baseline in 2004.
On balance, Table 2 indicates that the implementation of such a broader-based in-
terest rate rule over the entire 1995-2004 period would have lowered the level of
all components of domestic demand and thus have reduced the level of US GDP
by 0.6 per cent relative to the historical baseline by 20041.
1. I.e. the discounted cumulative deviation from baseline level.Working Paper 17-05
37
Inflationary pressures in the United States are tempered by the fall in effective de-
mand and by the relatively strong effective appreciation of the dollar, leaving the
US GDP deflator 0.8 per cent below its historical baseline level in both 2000 and
2001. However, once demand recovers and the dollar begins to weaken, prices
tend to rise and the GDP deflator returns to its baseline level in 2004.
Finally, the fall in aggregate demand lowers labour demand marginally during
the first years. However, as of 2001, domestic output rebounds and private sector
labour demand rises above its historical baseline, reaching a high of 0.4 per cent
above baseline in 2002. In 2004, private sector labour demand settles at just 0.2 per
cent above baseline.
FIGURE 27 - Interest and exchange rates in the United States: counterfactual
outcome for the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline)
FIGURE 28 - Asset prices in the United States: counterfactual outcome
for the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
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4. Japan
Table 13 and figures 31 to 34 show the main counterfactual simulation results for
Japan.
In Japan, the behaviour of the short-term interest rate differs somewhat from
what is observed in the other main economic areas. First, as nominal interest rates
were already very low during most of the 1995-2004 period, there was not much
room for further interest rate cuts in Japan. Second, in contrast to what was hap-
pening in the other major economic areas, the Japanese stock market indices fell
steadily throughout most of the 1995-2004 period. Third, as indicated in Table 9,
under the alternative interest rate rule the responses of Japanese monetary au-
FIGURE 29 - Macroeconomic aggregates in the United States: counterfactual
outcome for the 1994-2004 period
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
  
FIGURE 30 - Components of aggregate demand in the United States: counter-
factual outcome for the 1994-2004 period
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
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thorities to changes in equity prices are relatively small, reflecting the low share
of expenditures on equity in households’ outlays.
For the other major economic areas, the counterfactual simulation results indicate
that the short-term interest rate deviates most from its historical baseline level in
1999 and 2000, with the short-term interest rate 0.9 percentage-point above base-
line in the euro area and 1.4 percentage-points above baseline in the United
States. In contrast, the Japanese short-term interest rate is cut by 0.1 percentage-
point in 1999, while the historical baseline interest rate already stood at a low of
0.2 per cent that year1. The most important effect of this asymmetric evolution of
interest rates between Japan and the other major economic areas is the sharp rel-
ative depreciation that it induces for the Japanese nominal effective exchange rate
between 1998 and 2002. Indeed, during this period the nominal effective ex-
change rate depreciates by up to 7.4 per cent relative to the historical baseline in
2000. As of 2001, interest rates fall below baseline in the other major economic ar-
eas, while the Japanese interest rate already lies on its lower bound. This leads to
a reduction in the interest rate differential and a gradual return towards baseline
of the Japanese nominal effective exchange rate, which even appreciates relative
to its historical baseline level as of 2003. As of 2002, Japan’s real effective exchange
rate appreciates due to the rise in the general price level between 2000 and 2004
brought about by stronger demand.
Private consumption rises to 0.2 per cent above its historical baseline level in 1998
and 1999, but then falls to 0.3 per cent below baseline in 2004 as higher domestic
prices erode the purchasing power of households’ financial assets. Gross fixed
capital formation rises to 0.4 per cent above baseline in 1999, but falls 0.4 per cent
below baseline in 2004.
Japanese international trade is primarily affected by the changes in the exchange
rate. Indeed, after an initial loss between 1995 and 1997, exports rise and climb to
3.6 per cent above baseline in 2001. However, in 2004, exports fall back below
baseline as the rebound in foreign effective demand no longer suffices to offset
the negative effects of the real currency appreciation. Imports remain close to
baseline as the effects of the changes in the real effective exchange rate and in do-
mestic demand cancel each other out.
All in all, the counterfactual simulation indicates that a broader interest rate rule
would have driven Japanese real GDP up above its historical baseline from 1998
to 2002. More specifically, in 1999, when GDP in other areas would have hit their
trough, real GDP in Japan would have come out 0.4 per cent above baseline, main-
ly due to the boost to exports resulting from the strong depreciation of the yen.
However, in 2004, exports would have fallen below baseline and real Japanese
GDP would have sank 0.4 per cent below baseline.
Summarizing the results, Table 2 shows that the implementation of the alterna-
tive interest rate rule would have increased the level of Japanese GDP by 1.3 per
cent above baseline by the end of 20042, mainly due to the 8.9 per cent surge in
the cumulative level of exports by the end of the period.
1. Note that 0.1 per cent is the technical lower bound for nominal interest rates in the NIME model.
2. Measured as the discounted cumulative deviations of these variables from baseline levels.Working Paper 17-05
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FIGURE 31 - Interest and exchange rates in Japan: counterfactual outcome for 
the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline) 
FIGURE 32 - Asset prices in Japan: counterfactual outcome for the 
1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
FIGURE 33 - Macroeconomic aggregates in Japan: counterfactual outcome for 
the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent)
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FIGURE 34 - Components of aggregate demand in Japan: counterfactual 
outcome for the 1994-2004 period 
(deviation from historical baseline, in per cent) 













5. Detailed tables: The counterfactual outcome for the major economic 
areas over the 1995-2004 period
TABLE 10 - A counterfactual simulation for the euro area: 1995-2004
(deviation from baseline level, in per cent or percentage-points)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Demand & supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.0 0.4 0.6 0.4
Public consumption -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0
Gross fixed capital formation 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.3 0.7 1.3 1.0
of which business sector 0.3 0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -0.5 0.9 1.8 1.3
Exports (consolidated) 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3
Imports (consolidated) 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4
Gross domestic product 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.0 0.4 0.6 0.4
Gross private sector output 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.0 0.4 0.6 0.4
Deflators
Gross domestic product 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0
Private consumption 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0
Exports 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Imports 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Labour market
Total employment 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
of which private sector 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Unemployment rate (level, % of labour force) -0.0 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6
Nominal wage, private sector 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.0 0.2 0.3
Take home real wage, private sector 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3
Producer real wage, private sector 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Productivity (GDP per employee) 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) -0.3 -0.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.9 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.3
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2
Stock market indice 2.9 1.6 -5.5 -9.6 -7.7 -10.7 1.7 14.2 22.4 6.4
Deflator of residential buildings 1.0 0.6 -1.5 -2.8 -2.1 -3.6 0.2 3.0 4.2 1.6
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) 0.0 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2
Government gross debt (% of GDP) -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.4
Household sector
Total available means 0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 0.1 0.7 1.1 0.5
of which real disposable income 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3
Net saving by households (level, % of dispos. income) -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
International environment
Foreign effective output 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
Foreign effective price level 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.0
Foreign effective interest rate (level) 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.2
Current account (level, % of GDP) -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.0Working Paper 17-05
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TABLE 11 - A counterfactual simulation for the Western non-euro EU Member States: 1995-2004
(deviation from baseline level, in per cent or percentage-points)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Demand & supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1
Public consumption -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1
of which business sector 0.2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2
Exports (consolidated) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.1
Imports (consolidated) 0.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.6 0.5 -0.1
Gross domestic product 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
Gross private sector output 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.0
Deflators
Gross domestic product -0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.0
Private consumption 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.2
Exports 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0
Imports 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 0.4
Labour market
Total employment 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
of which private sector 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.0
Unemployment rate (level, % of labour force) -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Nominal wage, private sector 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Take home real wage, private sector 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1
Producer real wage, private sector 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
Productivity (GDP per employee) 0.1 0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 0.4 0.8 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.6 1.8 0.4 -0.8 -0.9
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) 0.4 0.8 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.6 1.8 0.3 -0.8 -0.9
Stock market indice 2.2 -0.5 -3.7 -6.8 -8.3 -6.6 -1.7 2.5 5.5 2.0
Deflator of residential buildings 0.4 -0.0 -0.5 -1.2 -1.4 -1.2 -0.7 0.2 0.9 0.6
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Government gross debt (% of GDP) -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.0 0.0
Household sector
Total available means 0.1 -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 -0.0 0.2 0.0
of which real disposable income 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.0
Net saving by households (level, % of dispos. income) -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
International environment
Foreign effective output 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.0 0.4 0.5 0.3
Foreign effective price level 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Foreign effective interest rate (level) -0.0 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 -0.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.2
Current account (level, % of GDP) -0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.0Working Paper 17-05
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TABLE 12 - A counterfactual simulation for the United States: 1995-2004
(deviation from baseline level, in per cent or percentage-points)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Demand & supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.5
Public consumption 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
Gross fixed capital formation -0.1 -0.4 -0.9 -1.0 -1.0 -0.7 0.6 1.7 1.6 0.8
of which business sector -0.1 -0.5 -1.1 -1.3 -1.3 -1.0 0.3 1.6 1.5 0.7
Exports 0.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -1.0 -1.2 -0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.3
Imports -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4
Gross domestic product -0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.5 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.4
Gross private sector output -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.5
Deflators
Gross domestic product -0.0 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.0
Private consumption -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2
Exports 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Imports -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
Labour market
Total employment -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2
of which private sector -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2
Unemployment rate (level, % of labour force) 0.4 0.7 0.7 1.5 2.1 1.7 1.3 0.7 -0.1 0.1
Nominal wage, private sector -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -0.9 -0.6 -0.2 0.1
Take home real wage, private sector -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.3
Producer real wage, private sector -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.1
Productivity (GDP per employee) -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.0 -0.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.3
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.6 -1.7 -1.3 -0.7 -0.2 0.3
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.6 -1.6 -1.2 -0.7 -0.2 0.3
Stock market indice -1.1 -4.5 -8.9 -11.4 -12.6 -8.7 3.5 15.3 17.5 4.9
Deflator of residential buildings -0.3 -1.1 -2.4 -3.3 -3.9 -3.2 0.1 2.4 3.3 2.0
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Government gross debt (% of GDP) 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.4 0.1
Household sector
Total available means -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -1.0 -0.7 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.5
of which real disposable income -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4
Net saving by households (level, % of dispos. income) 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
International environment
Foreign effective output 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2
Foreign effective price level 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Foreign effective interest rate (level) 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.0
Current account (level, % of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0Working Paper 17-05
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TABLE 13 - A counterfactual simulation for Japan: 1995-2004
(deviation from baseline level, in per cent or percentage-points)  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Demand & supply (in constant prices)
Private consumption -0.0 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
Public consumption 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Gross fixed capital formation -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.4
of which business sector -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.0
Exports -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 0.2 1.8 3.1 3.6 2.7 0.7 -1.4
Imports -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0
Gross domestic product -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.0 -0.4
Gross private sector output -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.0 -0.4
Deflators
Gross domestic product -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
Private consumption -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6
Exports -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.8 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.0
Imports -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.0
Labour market
Total employment -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
of which private sector -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.0
Unemployment rate (level, % of labour force) 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0
Nominal wage, private sector -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.3
Take home real wage, private sector -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.0 -0.3
Producer real wage, private sector -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2
Productivity (GDP per employee) -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.0 -0.4
Financial sector
Nominal short-term interest rate (level) 0.4 0.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Nominal long-term interest rate (level) 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Nominal effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -1.0 -1.7 0.1 3.7 6.5 7.4 5.4 1.4 -2.3 -4.0
Real effective exchange rate (-: apprec.) -0.9 -1.4 0.3 3.5 5.7 5.7 3.0 -1.0 -3.9 -4.9
Stock market indice -3.9 -6.6 -3.0 3.6 1.3 -3.6 -1.4 -4.8 -4.8 -5.1
Deflator of residential buildings -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Public finances
Government net lending (% of GDP) -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Government gross debt (% of GDP) 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.4 -1.5 -1.1 -0.2
Household sector
Total available means -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
of which real disposable income -0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0
Net saving by households (level, % of dispos. income) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
International environment
Foreign effective output 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.4
Foreign effective price level -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.0
Foreign effective interest rate (level) 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 -0.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.3
Current account (level, % of GDP) -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 -0.1Working Paper 17-05
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IV Appendix A: The NIME model
The NIME model is a macroeconometric world model developed by economists at
the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau.
A.A macroeconometric world model
In the current version of the NIME model, the world is divided into six blocs, i.e.
the euro area, the bloc consisting of the Western EU Member States that do not be-
long to the euro area1, the Eastern non-euro EU Member States, the United States,
Japan and a bloc representing the rest of the world. All these country blocs are
linked together by trade and financial flows. Data for the euro area is aggregated
using ECU/euro exchange rates. Data for the Western non-euro EU Member States
and the Eastern non-euro EU Member States are aggregated in a common synthet-
ic currency unit.
In all of these blocs but two, i.e. the Eastern non-euro EU Member States and the
rest of the world, we distinguish a household sector, an enterprise sector, a gov-
ernment sector and a monetary sector. A similar set of behavioural equations and
accounting identities is specified for each sector across blocs, while the parameter
values of the equations are obtained using econometric techniques applied to the
aggregated, annual data of the different blocs.
The household sector allocates its total available means over goods and services,
real money balances, residential buildings and other assets as a function of the
nominal interest rate, the real interest rate, the user cost of residential buildings
and a scale variable. This scale variable consists of the household sector’s assets
(including bonds and residential buildings), its current income from assets, its
current and expected future take-home labour income and its transfers. Error cor-
rection mechanisms and partial adjustment schemes are used to capture sluggish
adjustment in the expenditure plans of the household sector. Moreover in the
short-run the household sector is liquidity-constrained, implying that a fraction
of its expenditures must be financed by disposable income.
The enterprise sector maximises its profits by hiring production factors and sell-
ing its output to final users. Gross output consists of goods for private
consumption, investment and exports. There are three production factors: labour,
fixed capital and intermediary imports. Error correction mechanisms and partial
adjustment schemes are used to model the short-run demand for the production
1. I.e. Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.Working Paper 17-05
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factors. In these demand schemes, the long-run factor demand equations are de-
rived from a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale.
Prices and wages are not fully flexible and clear the markets only in the long-run.
Moreover, country blocs are engaged in multilateral trade where importers are
price setters and exporters are price takers, except for the price of oil which is de-
termined outside the model. The (equilibrium) real wage rate is a weighted
average of labour productivity and the reservation wage, while the natural rate
of unemployment is determined by the gap between the take-home wage and the
reservation wage of the employees.
Government income is determined by endogenous tax bases and predetermined
tax rates, while its expenditures are to a large extent determined by the business
cycle and trend growth. The automatic fiscal stabilisers operate on the expendi-
ture side mainly through unemployment benefits and interest payments on
government gross debt and, on the revenue side, mainly through direct wage in-
come taxes, profit taxes, social security contributions and indirect taxes.
In the default version of the model, the short-term interest rates are set according
to the Taylor principle. This implies that the monetary authorities increase (de-
crease) the short-term nominal interest rate more than proportionally to increases
(decreases) in inflation, thus increasing (decreasing) real interest rates when infla-
tionary pressures arise (subside). It also implies that the monetary authorities
keep the short-term interest rate below (above) the equilibrium interest rate if de-
mand is below (above) potential output. Long-term interest rates are determined
by the term structure theory of interest rates. Changes in an area’s nominal effec-
tive exchange rate are determined by changes in the interest rate differential and
the (expected) inflation differential. The risk premiums in the financial markets
are kept constant.
B.Case studies, technical variants and economic outlooks for the 
world economy
Several studies have been made with the NIME model. Meyermans (2002.a and
2002.b) used the NIME model to investigate to what extent the working of the au-
tomatic fiscal stabilisers and monetary policy can contribute to the full realisation
of potential output and price stability. Meyermans (2003) used the NIME model to
assess the transmission of shocks from the United States to the euro area under
alternative exchange rate policies. Meyermans (2004) studied with the NIME mod-
el how a cut in the social security contribution rate and an increase in the labour
participation rate affect economic activity in the medium-term. Meyermans and
Van Brusselen (2003) examined with the NIME model the impact on the Belgian in-
ternational environment of a temporary worldwide autonomous drop in private
consumption, a further monetary easing by the European Central Bank, a fiscal
consolidation in the euro area and of a prolonged worldwide fall in stock mar-
kets, while Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2005.b) used the NIME model to
describe the macroeconomic effects of an oil price rise. Finally, in addition to these
variants, Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2004 and 2005.a) used the NIME model
to prepare economic outlooks for the world economy for the periods ranging
from 2004 to 2010 and from 2005 to 2011, respectively.Working Paper 17-05
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C.Asset prices in the NIME model
Here, we recall and extend some of the asset price equations of the NIME model,
and we also describe briefly the sources of some of the data.
1. Asset price equations
We start with the specification of the price setting for the financial assets, next we
discuss the price setting for residential buildings. 
The household sector’s portfolio of financial assets consists of equity and bonds
(including financial instruments derived from equity and bonds), i.e.: 
(A.1) CAOU = CAOEU + CAOBU
with CAOU the total stock of financial assets in current prices held by the house-
hold sector, CAOEU the stock of equity and CAOBU the stock of bonds. 
The price of the total portfolio, PCAO, is defined as:
(A.2)  PCAO = caob PCAOB + (1-caob) PCAOE
with PCAOB the unit price of the households’ bond portfolio, PCAOE the unit
price of the households’ equity portfolio, and with caob the share of bonds in the
portfolio satisfying the condition 0 caob 11.
In equilibrium, the price of the households’ bond portfolio, PCAOB, is deter-
mined by the price of the long-term bond, which is equal to 1/LI with LI the long-
term interest rate, and the price of short-term bills, which is equal to 1, as:
(A.3)  ln(PCAOB) = pcaob_l0 + (1-pcaob_l1) ln(1) + pcaob_l1 ln(1/LI)
= pcaob_l0 + pcaob_l1 ln(1/LI)
with pcaob_l1 the share of long-term bonds and 0 pcaob_l1 1.
In equilibrium, the price of the households’ equity portfolio, PCAOE, is propor-
tional to the stock market index, i.e.: 
(A.4)  ln(PCAOE) = pcaoe_l0 +  pcaoe_l1 ln(STOCK)
with STOCK the stock market index. 
In the NIME model, prices adjust only sluggishly to their equilibrium level due to
menu and information costs, see for example Meyermans and Van Brusselen




(2001). Hence, PCAOB and PCAOE are determined by the following error correc-
tion mechanism, i.e.1:
(A.5)  d ln(PCAOB) = (1-pcaob_sl) (pcaob_sw-1) [ln(PCAOB-1) - ln(PCAOBR)] 
+ (1-pcaob_sl) pcaob_sw d ln(UCAOB)
and
(A.6)  d ln(PCAOE) = (1-pcaoe_sl) (pcaoe_sw-1) [ln(PCAOE-1) - ln(PCAOER)] 
+ (1-pcaoe_sl) pcaoe_sw d ln(UCAOE)
with:  0  pcaob_sl, pcaob_sw, pcaoe_sl, pcaoe_sw  1
The parameter px_sl is the fraction of the composite good x (x = CAOE, CAOB)
for which the price is kept at its old price due to menu costs, and the parameter
px_sw is the fraction of the prices that are revised according to a rule of thumb
due to information costs. 
The rational reset prices, PCAOBR and PCAOER, are defined in equations (A.3)
and (A.4) respectively, and the rule of thumb price changes are set as ln(UCAOB)
= d ln (PCAOB-1) and d ln(UCAOE) = G_PCAOE with G_PCAOE the HP filtered
trend. 
Point estimates for equations (A.5) and (A.6) are shown in tables 15 and 16.
TABLE 14 - Price of bonds: point estimatesa  
TABLE 15 - Price of equity: point estimatesa  
The price of residential buildings is set according to a similar price setting
scheme, i.e.: 
(A.7) d ln(PCIR) = (1-pcir_sl) (pcir_sw-1) [ln(PCIR-1) - ln(PCIRR)] 
+ (1-pcir_sl) pcir_sw d ln (UCIR).
1. See equation (F.11) of Appendix F in Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2000.b). 
Euro area Non-euro EU United States Japan
pcaob_sl 0.29 0.89 0.95 0.87
 (0.21) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
pcaob_sw 0.50 0.42 0.27 0.40
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14)
a  Equation (A.5). Standard errors between brackets
Euro area Non-euro EU United States Japan
pcaoe_sl 0.29 0.64 0.27 0.67
 (0.30) (0.10) (0.15) (-.-)
pcaoe_sw 0.33 0.11 0.01 0.17
 (0.28) (-.-) (0.17) (0.23)
a  Equation (A.6). Standard errors between brackets; if no standard error is given the parameter is
fixed at its unrestricted estimate (with the wrong sign) plus one (or two) standard errors. 
≤≤Working Paper 17-05
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Point estimation results for equation (A.7) are given in Table (19).
TABLE 16 - Price of residential buildings: point estimatesa  
2. The data
In addition to the data descriptions presented in various other NIME Working Pa-
pers, we add here the following information.
The stock price indices for the various economic areas, STOCK, are measured as
follows. For the euro area, we compute a composite euro area indice which is a
GDP-weighted average of quotes for the German Dax, the French CAC40, the Ital-
ian MIBtel and the Belgian BEL20 indices; for the Western non-euro EU Member
States, we use the UK’s FT100 indice; for the United States, we use the S&P500 in-
dice; and for Japan, we use the Nikkei225 indice.
The household sector’s bond and equity holdings, CAOEU and CAOBU, are
computed on the basis of data published in the household wealth and indebted-
ness tables, available in the statistical annexes of the OECD’s economic outlooks
(see for example OECD (2005), Annex Table 58. “Household wealth and
indebtedness”).
The price of equity, PCAOE, is calculated starting from:
(A.8) CAOEU  = 
where AOEU is the acquisition of new equities.
Equation (A.8) states that the current value of the equity portfolio is equal to the
portfolio inherited from the past and evaluated at current prices plus the net pur-
chase of new equity. Equation (A.8) can be rewritten as:
(A.9) PCAOE = 
Normalising the price of PCAOE to 1 in 1995, equation (A.9) can be used to cal-
culate the rest of the series. 
The variable AOEU is computed as follows:
(A.10)  AOEU = cear_0 AOU
Euro area Non-euro EU United States Japan
pcir_sl 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.18
 (0.17) (-.-) (0.52) (0.10)
pcir_sw 0.99 0.85 0.91 0.47
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) (0.11)
a Equation (A.7). Standard errors between brackets, if no standard error is given the parameter is






---------------------------------------------- PCAOE-1Working Paper 17-05
52
where cear_0 is the share of equities in household net equity and bond balances,
also derived from OECD data. The variable AOU, measuring the total net acquisi-
tion of equities and bonds by households, is computed as the difference between
the net saving of households (NSH) and household residential investment (IRU),
the change in household inventories (DINVHU) and the change in household
money balances (M):
(A.11)  AOU = NSH - IRU - DINVHU - (M-M-1)
A series for PCAO is calculated in a similar way as we did for the PCAOE series.
A series for PCAOB is calculated using equation (A.2) and the previously com-
puted data for PCAO and PCAOE.Working Paper 17-05
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V Appendix B: A broad-based interest rate rule
In this appendix, we specify a broad-based interest rate rule. Under this new rule
the short-term interest rate does not only respond to deviations of consumer price
inflation from its target rate and the output gap, but also to deviations of asset
price inflation from its target rate and changes in the output gap.
In the first section of this appendix, we define a broad price index for the house-
hold sector on the basis of the household sector’s intertemporal utility
optimization problem. There we show that the broad price index does not only
include the traditional consumer price index but also the prices of liquidity serv-
ices, residential buildings, and equities. In the second section, we specify an
interest rate rule based on the broad price index and a functional form similar to
the Taylor rule. We conclude the second section by calculating values for the pa-
rameters of the new interest rate rule.
A.A broad price index for the household sector
1. A quantity and price vector for the household sector
In the NIME model, the household sector allocates its total available means over
goods and services, money balances (which provide monetary services), residen-
tial buildings (which provide housing services) and financial assets (other than
money, which provide future purchasing power) in such a way that it maximises
its intertemporal utility subject to its intertemporal budget constraint.
In Appendix A of Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2000.a) it is shown that the in-
tertemporal optimization problem of the household sector can be characterised in
terms of the goods vector Y and price vector  , which read as1: 
(B.1.a)  = (CPO,  , CIRO, Z) 







(B.1.b)  = (PCH,  PCH,   PCIR,
) 
with CPO private consumption, M nominal money balances, PCH the consumer
price, CIRO the stock of residential buildings, Z assets generating purchasing
power in the future, LIC the interest rate1, PCIR the price of residential buildings,
and   the rate of depreciation of the residential buildings.
The price vector reads in short-hand notation also as2:
(B.1.f) = (PCH, PM, USERIR, PZ).
The variable Z is defined as:
(B.2) Z = (M+CIRO PCIR+1+ INVHO  PINVH+1 
+ CAOU (1+LIC) + ZY+1)/PCH+1
with INVHO inventories held by households, PINVH the price of inventories,
CAOU the stock of financial assets (equity plus bonds) and ZY expected future
non-asset income.
Let w_cpo, w_m, w_ciro and w_z be the shares of the goods CPO, M, CIRO and
Z in total household outlays3, then we define the household sector’s overall price
index P as:
(B.3.a) ln(P) = w_cpo ln(PCH) + w_m ln(PM) + w_ciro ln(USERIR)+ w_z ln(PZ)
1. LIC is a weighted average of the short-term and long-term interest rate.
2. We define:
(B.1.c) PM =  PCH, 
(B.1.d) USERIR =   PCIR
(B.1.e) PZ = 
See also Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2000.b).
3. Let:
TOTMEANS = CPO PCH + (M/PCH) PM + CIRO USERIR + Z PZ, 
then we define:
w_cpo = CPO * PCH / TOTMEANS
w_m = (M/PCH) * PM / TOTMEANS
w_ciro = CIRO * USERIR / TOTMEANS
w_z = Z * PZ / TOTMEANS
so that:
w_cpo + w_m + w_ciro + w_z = 1.
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with: 
(B.3.b) 0<w_cpo, w_m, w_ciro, w_z <1 
and 
(B.3.c) w_cpo+ w_m + w_ciro + w_z = 1.
2. Equity, real estate and bonds imperfect substitutes
In the NIME model, the household sector’s total financial wealth (other than mon-
ey) consists of equities and bonds, i.e.: 
(B.4.a) CAOU = CAOBU + CAOEU
with 
(B.4.b) CAOBU = CAOBO PCAOB
(B.4.c) CAOEU = CAOEO PCAOE
where CAOU is total household financial assets in current prices, CAOBU the
stock of interest yielding bonds in current prices, CAOEU the stock of equity in
current prices, CAOBO the stock of bonds in constant prices, PCAOB the price of
equity, CAOEO the stock of equity in constant prices and PCAOE the price of
equity.
Previously it was assumed in the NIME model that bonds and equity are perfect
substitutes yielding an (expected) return equal to LIC (LIC=PCAOE+1/PCOE-1).
Here, we assume that bonds and equity are no longer perfect substitutes, imply-
ing that their expected returns may differ. A similar assumption applies for the
substitutability between bonds and real estate. Hence, to reflect the new assump-
tions regarding substitutability, we re-define the vector Z, previously defined in
equation (B.2) for the case of perfect substitutability, as:
(B.5.a)   =  [(M+INVHO PINVH+1+CAOBU (1+LIC)+ZY+1)/PCH+1, 
 CIRO PCIR+1/PCH+1, CAOEO  PCAOE+1/PCH+1]
with corresponding price vector:
(B.5.b)  = [ ,  ,   ]
The interpretation of these prices is as follows. Let us first consider the case of
bonds (and its substitutes). Holding bonds for one period yields an interest LIC.
Z' 1 ρinvh – ()
1 ρiro – ()
Πz'
PCH+1
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-------------------
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Hence, the expected purchasing power of carrying one unit of bonds to the next
period is equal to  . In other words, if one wants to obtain one real unit of
purchasing power in the next period by holding bonds, one has to pay today the
unit price  .
Furthermore, in order to obtain one unit of purchasing power in the next period
by holding one unit of residential buildings, one has to buy today residential
buildings at the price  .
Similarly, in order to obtain one unit of purchasing power in the next period by
holding one unit of equities, one has to buy today a unit of equity at the price
.
Using equation (B.5.b), the price of the aggregate Z is then defined as1: 
(B.6.a) ln(PZ) = wz_zy ln  + wz_ciro ln
+ wz_cooe ln
with
(B.6.b) 0< wz_zy, wz_ciro, wz_cooe < 1 
and
(B.6.c) wz_zy +wz_ciro + wz_cooe =1.
Using condition (B.6.c), equation (B.6.a) can be rewritten as:
(B.7) ln(PZ) = ln(PCH+1) - wz_zy ln(1+LIC) + wz_ciro ln  
+ wz_cooe ln
1. With the shares defined as: 
wz_zy = [(M+INVHO PINVH+1+CAOBU (1+LIC)+ZY+1)/PCH+1]  
wz_ciro = [CIRO PCIR+1/PCH+1]     = 
wz_cooe =       = 
The variable Q is defined as:
Q = Z’ .
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3. A broad price index in levels
Using equations (B.1.c)-(B.1.e) and (B.7), we rewrite equation (B.3.a) as:
(B.8) ln(P) = w_cpo ln (PCH)
+ w_m ln
+ w_ciro ln
+ w_z [ln(PCH+1) - wz_zy ln(1+LIC) + wz_ciro ln   
+ wz_cooe ln ]
so that on collecting terms and using equation (B.3.c):
(B.9) ln(P) = ln(PCH) 
+ w_m ln(LIC) - (w_m + w_ciro + w_z wz_zy) ln(1+LIC)
+ w_ciro ln 
+ w_ciro ln   
+ w_z ln  
- w_z [wz_ciro ln  + wz_cooe ln ].
Equation (B.9) shows how the broad price index of the household sector aug-
ments the traditional consumer price index, PCH, by interest rate charges, the real
price of residential buildings, the expected change in consumer prices, and the ex-
pected change in the prices of houses and assets.
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4. A broad price index in first differences
Taking first differences of (B.9) yields:
(B.10) d ln(P) = d ln(PCH) 
+ w_m d ln(LIC)- (w_m + w_ciro + w_z wz_zy) d ln(1+LIC)
+ w_ciro d ln 
+ w_ciro d ln   
+ w_z d ln
- w_z wz_ciro d ln  
- w_z wz_cooe d ln
so that, on keeping the rate of depreciation   constant, we can simplify the
change in the broad price index as1: 
(B.11.a) d ln(P) = d ln(PCH) + p_1 d LIC + p_2 d ln 
+ p_3 d ln   + p_4 d ln  + p_5 d ln
with: 
(B.11.b) p_1 = w_m / LIC - (w_m + w_ciro + w_z wz_zy) / (1+LIC)
+ w_ciro / [LIC +   -    ] 0
(B.11.c) p_2 = w_ciro > 0
(B.11.d) p_3 = w_z > 0
1. Here we made use of:
d ln(1+LIC) =   d (1+LIC) =   d LIC
d ln(LIC) =   d LIC
d ln [LIC +   -  ] 
= 1/[LIC +   -  ] d (LIC +   -  ]
and:
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(B.11.e) p_4 = -w_z wz_ciro - w_ciro / [LIC +   -  ]
 0
(B.11.f) p_5 = -w_z wz_cooe < 0.
B.The broad price index and the interest rate rule
Now that we have defined a broad-based price index, we will integrate this index
into an interest rate rule.
1. The Taylor rule
Consider the interest rate rule:
(B.12) SI = si_sl {HP_LI + si_1 [INFL - TARGETINFL] + si_2 OUTPUTGAP}
  - (1-si_sl) SI-1 + SI_V
with INFL some measure of inflation, TARGETINFL the corresponding target in-
flation rate and OUTPUTGAP the output gap.
Equation (B.12) reads as a traditional Taylor rule augmented by a lagged short-
term interest rate and a stochastic component SI_V. The lagged short-term inter-
est rate reflects the importance that the monetary authorities may attach to
interest rate smoothing, while the stochastic component captures randomness in
human behaviour. 
2. The change in the broad price index and the targeted overall inflation rate
Usually, the contemporaneous consumer price inflation rate is used as the rele-
vant inflation measure in equation (B.12)1. In this Working Paper, we propose to
measure the inflation rate (INFL) by the rate at which the broad price index
changes2. By doing so we are able to derive a new interest rate rule. However, be-
fore we can do this we first have to define the targeted overall inflation rate.
Here, we assume that in equilibrium, prices grow at a steady rate, i.e.:
(B.13.a) d ln(PCH) = G_PCH












1. I.e. INFL = d ln(PCH).
2. As defined in equation (B.11).Working Paper 17-05
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(B.13.c) d ln(PCIR) = G_PCH + GQ_PCIR
(B.13.d) d ln(PCAOE) = G_PCAOE
where G_PCH is trend (or targeted) inflation, GQ_PCIR trend (or targeted) in-
crease in the real price of residential buildings, G_PCAOE the trend (or targeted)
increase in the price of equities, and HP_LI the equilibrium nominal interest rate.
In order to obtain the targeted increase in the overall price index, we evaluate
equation (B.11.a) for the targets spelled out in equation (B.13.a)-(B.13.d). This
yields:
(B.14)  TARGETINFL = G_PCH + p_1 d HP_LI + p_2 GQ_PCIR 
+ p_3 d G_PCH + p_4 d (G_PCH + GQ_PCIR) + p_5 d G_PCAOE.
3. The augmented interest rate rule
Inserting equations (B.11) and (B.14) into equation (B.12) yields, on rearranging
terms:
(B.15) SI = 
si_sl {HP_LI + si_1 [d ln(PCH) - G_PCH] + si_2 OUTPUTGAP}- (1- si_sl ) SI-1
+ si_sl si_s1 {p_1 [d LI - d HP_LI] 
+ p_2 [d ln   - GQ_PCIR]
+ p_3 [d ln   - d G_PCH ]
+ p_4 [d ln  - d (G_PCH + GQ_PCIR)]
+ p_5 [d ln  - d G_PCAOE]}
+ SI_V .
The first line on the right hand-side of equation (B.15) describes a traditional in-
terest rate rule, see for example equation (2) of the main text. The terms in the
following lines indicate by how much the traditional interest rate rule has to be
augmented if one wants to take into account all the welfare implications of con-
temporaneous and future price changes. However, before we proceed with the
discussion of this result we note here that some of the right-hand side variables
of equation (B.15) are not directly observed1. Therefore, we make the following
assumptions.

















First, in the NIME model, the expected consumer price inflation is determined by
the contemporaneous output gap and trend inflation1:
(B.16) ln   = (1-pch_sl) (pch_sw-1) pch_s1 OUTPUTGAP 
+ (1-pch_sl) G_PCH+1
where the parameters 0<pch_sl, pch_sw<1, and pch_s1<0 are obtained from the
equation determining contemporaneous inflation.
Second, real estate prices change according to equation (A.7) of Appendix A. Mu-
tatis mutandis, the latter equation holds also for the future changes in equity
prices, so that:
(B.17) ln  = (1-pcir_sl) (pcir_sw-1) [ln(PCIR) - ln(PCIRR+1)] 
+ (1-pcir_sl) pcir_sw [G_PCIR+1].
Third, equation (A.6) of Appendix A describes the change in the price of equity.
Mutatis mutandis, the latter equation holds also for the future changes in equity
prices, so that: 
(B.18) ln =(1-pcaoe_sl)  (pcaoe_sw-1) [ln(PCAOE)-ln(PCAOER+1)] 
+ (1-pcaoe_sl) pcaoe_sw [G_PCAOE]
Fourth, the trend growth rates in the different prices, i.e. G_PCH, GQ_PCIR, and
GQ_PCAOE are exogenous and they are equal to the value obtained applying a
Hodrick-Prescott to the corresponding historical price series. We assume here
that:
(B.19.a) G_PCH+1 = G_PCH
(B.19.b) GQ_PCIR+1 = GQ_PCIR
(B.19.c) G_PCAOE+1 = G_PCAOE.
Inserting equations (B.16), (B.17), (B.18) and (B.19.a)-(B.19.c) into equation (B.15)
and rearranging terms, yields:
1. See equation (F.14.a) of Appendix F of Meyermans and Van Brusselen (2000.b). Here, we assume 














(B.20) SI = 
si_sl {HP_LI+ si_1 [d ln(PCH) - G_PCH] + si_2 OUTPUTGAP}- (1- si_sl ) SI-1
+ si_sl si_s1 {p_1 [d LIC - d HP_LI]
+ p_2 [d ln   - GQ_PCIR]
+ p_3 (1-pch_sl) (pch_sw-1) pch_s1 d OUTPUTGAP
+ p_4 (1-pcir_sl) (pcir_sw-1) [d ln(PCIR) - (G_PCH + GQ_PCIR)]
+ p_5 {(1-pcaoe_sl) (pcaoe_sw-1) [d ln(PCAOE) - G_PCAOE]
- p_3 pch_sl d G_PCH 
+ p_4 [(1-pcir_sl) pcir_sw -1] d (G_PCH+GQ_PCIR)
+ p_5 [(1-pcaoe_sl) pcaoe_sw -1] d G_PCAOE
+  SI_V
Equation (B.20) augments the “traditional” interest rate rule (which only consid-
ers the deviation of consumer price inflation from targeted inflation and the
output gap) with the deviation of the long-term interest rate from the equilibrium
interest rate, the change in the real price of residential buildings vis-à-vis a target,
the change in the output gap, the change in the nominal price of residential build-
ings vis-à-vis a target, the change in the price of equity vis-à-vis a target, and the
changes in the targets.
4. Parameter values
The parameters of the augmented interest rate rule (B.20) are determined by the
parameters of the original Taylor rule (i.e. si_s1, si_s2 and si_sl), the budget shares
of the various expenditure items in the household budget (i.e. p1, ..., p5) and the
parameters of the price equations (i.e. px_sl and px_sw with x = ch, cir, caoe).
These parameter values are summarised in Table 17.




Euro area Non-euro EU United 
States
Japan
si_s1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
si_s2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
si_sl 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5
p1 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9
p2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
p3 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
p4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.0
p5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.0
 
pch_sl 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
pch_sw 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.3
pch_s1 -0.3 -0.7 -2.6 -0.5
 
pcir_sl 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
pcir_sw 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.5
 
pcaoe_sl 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5
pcaoe_sw 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2
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